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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EQUALITY OF POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
L. FLEISHMANt

JOEL

INTRODUCTION

At the end of 1971, a Democratic Congress and a Republican

President enacted into law' the first major federal election campaign
reform legislation since 1925.2 Behind the new law stretched two decades
of congressional hearings, 3 much scholarly research, 4 blue ribbon citizen commissions, 5 a President's Commission,' lobbying by public intertAssociate Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Policy Sciences and Public
Affairs, Duke University. The author expresses his gratitude to Professors Daniel Pollitt, Kenneth
Pye, and William Van Alstyne for their helpful criticisms of this article, and to Glenn Reichardt
and Chris Sawyer for their research assistance in connection with it.
'Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VII-VIII, 85 Stat. 560-74 [hereinafter cited as
Revenue Act]; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 [hereinafter
cited as Campaign Act].
'Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered
sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.). Indeed, because the 1925 Act was itself mainly a codification of preexisting legislation dating from 1907-1911, the 1971-1972 legislation constitutes the first substantive
overhaul of federal election law since it was first enacted.
3
According to Senator Hugh Scott, congressional committees have "held no less than 23 sets
of hearings" on election reform since 1906. 117 CONG. REC. S1913 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1971). The
most recent ones are: Hearings on H.R. 8627, H.R. 8628 (and related bills) Before the Subcomm.
on Communicationsand Power of the House, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1971); Hearingson S. 382 Before the Subcomm. on Privilegesand Elections of the Senate
Comm. on Rules and Administration, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on H.R. 8284 Before
the Subcomm. on Elections of the House Comm. on House Administration, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
4

The most influential study is Alexander Heard's

THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY

(1960), which

is as readable as it is authoritative. Heard's pioneering initiative has been augmented over the past
dozen years by the careful and thoughtful work of his former junior colleague, Herbert E. Alexander, in a series of articles and books which have been established him as the nation's foremost
student of campaign finances and their regulation. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1964
ELECTION

(1966); H. ALEXANDER,

FINANCING THE

FOR POLITICS: A MISCELLANY OF IDEAS

1968

(1963); H.

ELECTION

ALEXANDER,

ALEXANDER, MONEY, POLITICS AND PUBLIC REPORTING

IN PARTY FINANCE

(1963); H.

ALEXANDER

(1966);

AND CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICES,
ADAMANY,

& J.

ALEXANDER, MONEY

MONEY IN POLITICS

(1960); H.

(1972); H.

ALEXANDER, RESPONSIBILITY

BIBBY, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL CONVENTION

& L. DENNY, REGULATION OF POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICAL COMMITTEES TO INCUMBENTS

FINANCES AND ARRANGEMENTS
FINANCE

(1968); H.

(1971); H.

FINANCING POLITICS

ALEXANDER

1968 (H. Alexander & C. Jones ed. 1971). See also D.

(1969); D.

'COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME
GRESS-THE FINANCIAL DILEMMA

(1970).

DUNN, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

FINANCING

(1969);

(1969).

A BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM (1968);

TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ELECTING CON-

390
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est groups,7 and congressional efforts' aimed at reform of the law.
Ahead of it loom certain efforts to evade it,' amend it,l" repeal it," and
'PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1962).
rThe National Committee for an Effective Congress has long been active in the effort to bring
about campaign finance reform. Its National Director, Russell Hemenway, has testified at many
hearings on the subject. NCEC is reported by Alexander to have authored the 1970 Act, which
President Nixon vetoed. H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 267 (1972).
81n 1953, the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections proposed to raise political
committee expenditure limitations from 3 million dollars to 10 million dollars, and to increase the
limits on congressional campaign expenditures, but the Senate failed to act. In 1955, the same
Senate subcommittee recommended the extension of the reporting requirement to political committees operating exclusively within a single state, but the Senate failed to act. In 1956, majority leader
Lyndon B. Johnson and minority leader William F. Knowland jointly introduced comprehensive
reform legislation, with the co-sponsorship of eighty-three Senators, but it was killed in committee.
In 1960, the Senate passed the Hennings Bill, extending the candidate reporting requirement to
primaries and the political committee reporting requirement to those committees spending 2,500
dollars or more in any federal election campaign, limiting individual political contributions to
10,000 dollars in a single year, raising congressional campaign expenditure limitations, and imposing a twenty-cents-per-vote limit on presidential campaign expenditures, but the House failed to
pass it. In 1961, the Senate passed a weaker bill-the Cannon Bill-but again the House failed to
act. In 1963, the Senate incorporated a fifty dollar tax deduction for individuals (one hundred
dollars for married couples filing joint returns) into the Revenue. Act, but it was deleted in conference. In 1964, both Houses passed legislation to repeal the "equal time" provision of section 315
of the Federal Communications Act, as it applied to presidential elections, but it was also deleted
in conference. In 1966, both Houses passed, and the President signed, the Long Act, which provided
for a one dollar tax check-off to be paid into a Presidential Election Campaign Fund, but it was
repealed in 1967. In 1966, both Houses passed, and the President approved, the Williams amendment, which prohibited corporate advertising in political program books, but in 1967 this legislation was modified to permit corporations to purchase advertising in the quadrennial national
political convention program books. In 1967, the Senate unanimously passed President Johnson's
campaign reform bill, but again the House failed to act. Finally, in 1970 both Houses passed the
Political Broadcasting Act of 1970, but President Nixon vetoed it. For a discussion of the substantive provisions of these proposals, and an explanation of why they came as far as they did and no
farther, see H. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 198-229, 252-79.
'See N.Y. Times, March 26, 1972, § 1,at 1,col. 1.Note also the action of the House
Administration Committee on April 26, 1972, ordering the Clerk of the House-the supervisory
officer for the House of Representatives' campaign reports-to increase the cost of duplicating
disclosure statements from ten cents to one dollar a page. The chairman of the House Administration Committee, Congressman Wayne Hays, urged that his committee take over the role of
"supervisory officer" which the Act had assigned to the Clerk of the House. COMMON CAUSE, May
1972, at 2.
'IS. 3178, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (to repeal the "equal-time" provision for presidential
campaigns); H.R. 14213, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (introduced by Congressman Talcott, "to
repeal the lowest unit rate provisions" of the new act); H.R. 14804, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., (introduced by Congressman O'Neill, to provide publicly subsidized television time for presidential
candidates, 118 CONG. REC. H42122-23 (daily ed. May 4, 1972)); H.R. 14959, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972) (introduced by Congressman Veysey, to establish a Federal Elections Commission, 118
CONG. REc. E5589-90 (daily ed. May 22, 1972)); H.R. 15167, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (introduced by Congressman McCloskey to reinstate the $5,000 ceiling on individual campaign contributions, 118 CONG. REC. E5725-27 (daily ed. May 24, 1972)); H.R. 15276, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)
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to challenge its constitutionality."
Institutional inertia, interest group deadlock, and officeholders'

self-interest were not the only causes of a half-century of inaction. Popular election is the source of all authoritative governmental power in a

democracy, 3 and one does not tamper lightly with the keystone of the
political arch, even when it is patently cracking. It is therefore not

surprising that a consensus on change was so long in crystallizing.
It is undeniable, however, that cracks had formed in the keystone.
The congressional campaign limits-a maximum of 25,000 dollars for
Senate candidates and 5,000 dollars for House candidates-were openly
avoided by the use of campaign committees, which are not subject to
the statutory limits. The attempt to limit the amounts spent in presidential campaigns by imposing a three million dollar ceiling on political

committees' expenditures was evaded by creating a multiplicity of committees. The 5,000 dollar ceiling on individual campaign contributions
was also openly evaded by making 5,000 dollar contributions to a number of separate committees. Compliance with the reporting provisions
was casual at best; and because of the difficulty of obtaining access to

the information supposed to be disclosed, the public rarely had either
timely or adequate information on which to make informed voting judgonly the more "legal" ways of
ments on election day.' 4 And these were
5
avoiding the intent of the 1925 law.

(introduced by Congressman Devine "to exclude corporations and labor organizations" from
prohibition on political activity by government contractors, 118 CONG. REC. H5191 (daily ed. June
I, 1972)); H.R. 15511, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (introduced by Congressman Hays to reduce
the number and frequency of reports under the new Act).
1'H.R. 14054, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (introduced by Congressman Devine); see COMMON
CAUSE, May 1972, at 2; "T.R.B.," THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 27, 1972, p. 2.
"See A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS (1971); Barrow, Regulation of Campaign Fundingand Spendingfor FederalOffice, 5
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 159 (1972); Penniman, Financing Campaigns in the Public Interest, in
CAMPAIGN FINANCES (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1971); Redish,
Campaign Spending Laws and the FirstAmendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 900 (1971); Comment,
Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.
REV. 214 (1972); Note, Campaign Spending Regulation: Failure of the First Step, 8 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 640 (1971).
"3See generally Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
256.
14H. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 203; A. HEARD, supra note 4, at 168.
"5Among the less "legal" stratagems were the use of "dummy contributors," designed to
conceal the actual identity of the source of contributions. A similar aim could be achieved by using
such pass-through recipient committees as the Republican and Democratic senatorial and congressional campaign committees, which in turn "anonymously" contribute the funds to the congressional candidate of the donor's choice. Of course there were also the time-honored practices of
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Congressional approval of the 1971 Act did not stem primarily
from public embarassment over the spectacle of such feeble-letter law.
Rather it almost surely came about because of a growing anxiety-indeed a near panic-over rapidly mounting campaign costs. Between 1956 and 1972, it has been estimated that the total amount of
money spent in all elections in the United States increased from 155
million dollars to 400 million dollars.16 As the cost of running for office
steadily rose, many Americans, voters and officeholders alike, came to
fear that public office, which the American credo proclaims as open to
all, was rapidly being priced out of the reach of all but the wealthy or
well-connected. That fear has undoubtedly acquired confirmation and
widespread public acceptance as a result of both visibly expensive candidacies such as those of Nelson Rockefeller for Governor of New York, 7
Robert F. Kennedy and Richard Ottinger for Senator from New York,
Milton Shapp for Governor of Pennsylvania, and Howard Metzenbaum
for Senator from Ohio, and widely publicized withdrawals from candidacy, allegedly for insufficient funds, such as those of Eugene Nickerson" from the 1969 gubernatorial race in New York and Senator Fred
Harris 9 from the presidential race in the spring of 1971. There is little
doubt that this fear was father to the 1971 legislation.'"
A second but less compelling worry was that the need for more
campaign dollars would increasingly make all candidates dependent
upon campaign donations offered by moneyed interests with policy axes
to grind. In other words, the search for more funds would drive candidates to accept election campaign support from those wishing to obtain
post-election policy favors in return. While this pressure is certainly not
new, it is undeniably aggravated by spiraling campaign costs.
The extent to which these fears are well-grounded deserves serious
directly purchasing services needed by a candidate, such as postage or airline tickets, and donating

contributions in cash, neither of which could be easily traced, therefore invariably going unreported.
I6D.

DUNN, supra note 4, at 32, and sources cited therein; see NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1971, at
23; TIME, Oct. 23, 1972, at 24.
11H. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 47.
"Hearings on Political BroadcastingBefore the Subcomm. on Communications and Power
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1970).
t9N.Y. Times, Nov. II, 1971, at 21, cols. I & 2.
2See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 8248 Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the House Comn.
on Administration, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); Hearings on S. 382 Before the Subcomm. on
Privilegesand Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1971).
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consideration.2 1 For the moment, it is sufficient to point out that they
overcame several decades of inertia and resistance and resulted in new
campaign finance provisions that restrict individual political activity for
the sake of an alleged social good. Because of the teeth in the new
legislation, questions posed by the legislation must be faced for the first
time. To what degree may an individual's political liberty be restricted
in attempting to safeguard the purity of the election process?
THE

1971

LEGISLATION

There are two Acts which are pertinent to the discussion: The Federal Election Campaign Act of 19712 and Titles VII 4 and V111 21 of the
Revenue Act of 1971. While this article is addressed only to the former,
the provisions of the latter are contextually important. Both Acts
changed existing law in several important ways.
The Campaign Act broadened regulatory coverage beyond general
and special elections to include primaries, caucuses, and conventions,"
bringing within the scope of that extended coverage candidates for all
federal offices-the Presidency, the Vice Presidency, the United States
Senate, the United States House of Representatives, and Resident
Commissionership.27 Furthermore, it extended the requirement of registration by "political committees," which had been limited under preexisting laws to those operating in two or more states 2 in presidential
elections, to include every political committee that "anticipates receiving contributions or making expenditures during the calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000,1129 presumably only in elections for
federal office. 0
"See text accompanying notes 389-427 infra.
"As we shall see in text accompanying note 164-65 infra, the Supreme Court has never passed
squarely on the first amendment constitutionality of any campaign finance legislation.

"Campaign Act, 86 Stat. 3.
2'Revenue Act, tit. VII, 85 Stat. 560-62.

2Revenue Act, tit. VIII, 85 Stat. 562-74.
2

'Campaign Act § 201, 86 Stat. 8, amending 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1970); Campaign Act § 301(a),

86 Stat. II.
"Campaign Act § 102(3), 86 Stat. 4; Campaign Act § 201, 86 Stat. 8, amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 591 (1970); Campaign Act § 301(c), 86 Stat. 11. Preexisting law regulated only the candidacies
for membership in the Senate and House of Representatives; presidential campaigns were limited,
to the extent that they actually were, by the $3,000,000 limitation on "political committee" expenditures.
:"Federal Corrupt Practices Act § 302(c), 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1970).

"Campaign Act § 303, 86 Stat. 14.
"OUnlike the preexisting statutory definition of a political committee which expressly limited
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The new Act retains essentially the same contribution recordkeeping and reporting requirements-detailed records of all contributions
exceeding ten dollars3 and reports of all contributions exceeding one
hundred dollars 32-but to all the bits of information previously required
to be furnished it adds the donor's "occupation and principal place of
business, if any. 33 Furthermore, it raises from fifty dollars to one
hundred dollars the reporting requirement for contributions or expenditures made other than directly to political committees or candidates.34
Of much greater significance is the affirmative duty placed on supervisory officers, the Clerk of the House of Representatives for House
candidates, the Secretary of the Senate for Senate candidates, and the
Comptroller General for presidential candidates, to make the reports
available for public inspection and copying by hand or by duplicating
machine "not later than the end of the second day following the day
during which it was received."3" In addition, the supervisory officer is
required to publish an annual report that is to include, among other
things, the names of contributors of more than one hundred dollars.3 '
Also, for the first time federal law requires that reports and statements
pertaining to campaigns for federal office representing all or part of a
state also be filed with the Secretary of State of the respective state.37
Three changes were made with respect to contribution limitations.
In place of the 5,000 dollar ceiling on individual political contributions 5 in federal elections, the Campaign Act establishes a new kind
itself to committees in elections for President, the new Act nowhere limits itself to those political

committees involved in federal elections. As such committees are required to register with "supervisory officers," and as such supervisory officers are named only for the three major categories of

federal elections with which the Act deals, one might infer that only federal election political
committees are covered by the Act. But section 306(c) delegates to the supervisory officer the
discretionarypower to "relieve any category of political committee of the obligation to comply

with Section 304 if such committee (1) primarily supports persons seeking State or local office,
and does not substantially support candidates and (2) does not operate in more than one State or

on a statewide basis." Campaign Act, § 306(c), 86 Stat. 16. This suggests that Congress intended
all political committees, even those for local and state offices, to be covered by the Act. It is

doubtful whether Congress has constitutional authority to supervise state and local elections, See
text accompanying notes 106-14 infra.
"Campaign Act § 302(c)(2j, 86 Stat. 13.
"2 Campaign Act § 304(b)(2), 86 Stat. 15.
"Campaign Act §§ 302(c)(2), 304(b)(2), 86 Stat. 13, 15.

'Campaign Act § 305, 86 Stat. 16.
'Campaign Act § 308(a)(4), 86 Stat. 17.
3
Campaign Act § 308(a)(7), 86 Stat. 17.

3Campaign Act § 309(a), 86 Stat. 18.
-18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
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of contribution limitation: a limit on the amount a candidate may contribute to his own campaign, or obtain from members of his immediate
family. 9 The ceilings are 50,000 dollars for presidential candidates,
35,000 dollars for senatorial candidates, and 25,000 dollars for House
candidates. 0 The other changes were intended to codify existing case
law. One permitted banks to make bona fide bank loans to creditworthy borrowers for political purposes, thus ensuring that courts would
not regard such loans as contributions. 4' The other gave statutory approval to "voluntary" funds collected by corporations and labor unions
to be used for partisan political purposes. Apparently through oversight, the Congress neglected also to amend the prohibition on political
contributions by government contractors4 3 to permit the use in federal
elections of money from such "voluntary" funds even if the corporation
or labor union is also a government contractor." A bill to rectify the
error 45 was passed by the House" but died in the Senate's rush to recess
7

for the election.
The major change of the Campaign Act deals with expenditure
limitations on candidates for federal office.4 As has been noted, preexisting law imposed limits on the amount candidates for the Senate and
"Campaign Act § 203, 86 Stat. 9-10, amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970). "Family" is defined
to include
a spouse, child, parent, grandparent, sister, and spouses of such persons. Id.
401d.
"Campaign Act § 205, 86 Stat. 10, amending 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). This incorporates the
holding in United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
"Campaign Act § 205, 86 Stat. 10. There was an extensive floor debate on this point. See
118 CONG. REc. H88-9 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1972) (remarks of Representative Crane); id. at H9495 (remarks of Representative Hansen). Both Congressmen had wished to have the Act include
an express proviso that such funds could not be raised by any kind of pressure on members or
employees.
4318 U.S.C. § 611 (1970). This section was reenacted by Campaign Act § 206, 86 Stat. 10II, with only slight changes which made more specific the times within which such contributions,
or offers or invitations to contribute, are illegal.
"This apparent conflict between campaign Act § 205, 86 Stat. 10, amending 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970), and Campaign Act § 205, 86 Stat. 10-11, amending 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1970), has already
occasioned a civil suit by Common Cause to prevent TRW, Inc., a large government contractor,
from maintaining and using its TRW Good Government Fund for political purposes.
4"H.R. 15276, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see 118 CONG. REC. H5191 (daily ed. June 1, 1972)
(remarks of Congressman Devine).
"N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 32, col. 7.
'7CoMIION CAUSE, Nov. 1972, at 2.
"Campaign Act §§ 103-04, 86 Stat. 4-7, amending 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315 (1970). It should be
noted that the Act makes the broadcast spending limitation and maximum rate provisions available
in state and local campaigns if a state expressly provides by law that it wishes to make its elections
subject to the Act in this regard. Campaign Act § 104(c), 86 Stat. 7, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1970).
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House could spend,49 but they were unrealistically low and openly
avoided. There were no ceilings on the amount that presidential candidates could spend, except for the slight inconvenience caused by the
three million dollar "political committee" limitation.5" The 1971 Act
repealed the latter provision51 and substituted new expenditure limitations on the amount all federal candidates can spend for communications media.52 The overall media limitation for each candidate in each
phase of the election process is ten cents per voting age resident in the
jurisdiction which the candidate is seeking to represent or 50,000 dollars, whichever is greater.5 3 In addition to the overall media expenditure
limitation, the Act limits broadcast spending to sixty percent of the
amount available for overall media spending.54 All amounts spent "in
behalf of" a candidate are deemed to have been spent by the candidate.5
Furthermore, to put teeth into this limitation the Act makes it illegal
for any person to sell media space, time, or services without obtaining
a certification by the candidate or his agent that such expenditure does
not exceed his statutory limit.50
In addition to the media expenditure ceilings, the Campaign Act
establishes maximum rates that broadcast stations, newspapers, and
magazines may charge for political advertising by candidates for federal
offices. During the forty-five days before a primary or run-off primary
and the sixty days preceding a general or special election, broadcast
stations may charge for political advertising no more than "the lowest
unit charge for the same class and amount of time for the same period.""8 At all other times, they are limited to their rates for comparable
use of the station by other users.59 Newspapers and magazines are limited to the maximum rate they charge for comparable use of the equiva"Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered
sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.); see text accompanying note 14 supra.
5°18 U.S.C. § 609 (1970).

"Campaign Act § 204, 86 Stat. 10.
52
Campaign Act § 104, 86 Stat. 5. "Communications media" is defined as including "broadcasting stations, newspapers, magazines, outdoor advertising and telephones." Campaign Act
§ 102(1), 86 Stat. 3.
5Campaign Act § 104(a)(1)(A), 86 Stat. 5.
5
"Campaign Act § 104(a)(l)(B), 86 Stat. 5.

3Campaign Act § 104(a)(6), 86 Stat. 6.

5

Campaign Act § 104(b), 86 Stat. 6-7.
5TCampaign Act § 103, 86 Stat. 4, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
-Campaign Act § 103(a), 86 Stat. 4, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1970).
"I1d.
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lent space for other purposes.'
Title VII of the Revenue Act"1 establishes tax incentives for political contributions for the first time in the nation's history. The incentives
are available in federal, state, and local elections and can be claimed
for contributions to candidates, committees, or political parties." A
single taxpayer may claim, in the alternative, either a tax credit of onehalf of the amount of contributions up to a maximum credit of twelve
and a half dollars,63 or a tax deduction of one-half of the amount of
contributions up to a maximum deduction of fifty dollars. 4 Taxpayers
filing joint returns may claim up to twice the maximum for single taxpayers. Title VII was made effective with the 1972 tax year. 5
The Presidential Campaign Fund Act, Title VIII of the Revenue
Act, 6 which was not made effective until January 1, 1973,7 provides for
a tax check-off in the amount of one dollar for a single taxpayer or two
dollars for taxpayers filing joint returns," to be paid into a Presidential
Election Campaign Fund within the Treasury. Taxpayers may designate
a particular political party to receive their tax check-off. 9 While the
Act provides for the creation of the Fund and obviously contemplates
the establishment of accounts within the Treasury, no money can in fact
be paid into such accounts except by express appropriations measures
to be enacted by Congress in the future.70 This Act, therefore, will not
7
be operative until Congress takes additional action. 1
The Act divides eligible recipients into three categories: candidates
of major parties, defined as parties whose candidates for President received twenty-five percent or more of the total popular vote in the
preceding election; 72 candidates of minor parties, defined as parties
whose candidates received between five percent and twenty-five percent
"aCampaign Act § 103(b), 86 Stat. 4, amending47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1970). The differential in
rate ceilings represents a conference compromise between the House of Representatives, which had
proposed the "comparable use" formula for all media, and the Senate, which had proposed the
"lowest unit rate" for all media. See H.R. REP. No. 92-752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1971).
"Revenue Act, tit. VII, 85 Stat. 560-62.
"Revenue Act § 701, 85 Stat. 560-61, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 41(c).
"Revenue Act § 701, 85 Stat. 560, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 41(b)(1).
OARevenue Act § 702, 85 Stat. 561-62, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 218.
"Revenue Act § 703, 85 Stat. 562.
"Revenue Act, tit. VIII, 85 Stat. 562-74.
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 572, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9013.
"Revenue Act § 802, 85 Stat. 573, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6096(a).
62ld.
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 567, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9006(a).

"And Congress may, as it did with respect to the Long Act, fail to take such additional action.
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 563, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9002(6).
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of the total popular vote in the preceding presidential election;73 and
candidates of a new party, defined as a party which is neither "major"
nor "minor." 74 The candidate of major parties are eligible to receive
fifteen cents per eligible voter, determined as of June of the year preceding the election year.7" The formula for candidates of minor parties is
more complicated. A minor party's candidate is eligible to receive the
same proportion of Campaign Fund payments to major party candidates as its total popular vote in the preceding election bears to the
average total vote received in that election by the major party candidates.7 In other words the minor party payment formula is as follows:
Election Fund Payment to a Minor Party = Popular Vote for Minor Party
Election Fund Payment to a Major Party

/027

Average Vote for Major Party

If the minor party is fielding the same presidential candidate in the
current election as it did in the preceding election, it is also entitled to
have its total popular vote in that election taken into account in computing the amount it is eligible to receive in the current election.77
A minor party may also qualify its candidates for payment on a
formula based on the votes it receives in the current election." That
formula is the same as the one by which funds are allocated to the
candidates of a new party that receives more than five percent of the
popular vote in the current election. The formula is as follows:
Popular Vote for Minor or New
Fund Payments to Minor or New Party

Party in Current Election

Fund Payments to a Major Party

Average Vote for Major Party
in Current Election

036

The critical provision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act is the ceiling that it places on expenditures in presidential elections.
The Act makes eligibility for any payments to the candidates of any
party contingent on their agreement not to incur campaign debts in
excess of the amount to which major party candidates are entitled under
the Act.7" Major party candidates are permitted to raise funds privately
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 563, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9002(7).
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 565, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9002(8).
75Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 565, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9004(a)(l).
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 565, to be codifiedat NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9004(a)(2)(A).
77Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 565-66, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 9004(a)(2)(B). The statute is not at all clear as to how those popular votes are to be taken into
account. It is obvious, however, that it was intended that such payments were to be reduced by
the amounts under § 9004(a)(2)(A) and, therefore, were presumed to be larger.
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 566, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9004(a)(3).
"Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 565, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9003(b)(1),
(c)(I).
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only to the extent that actual payments from the Fund are less than the

amounts to which they are entitled under the distribution formulas."
Minor and new party candidates can raise private funds up to the

amounts which major parties are permitted to spend."1

It is important to recognize what the Acts do not do. They do not

impose any ceiling on overall expenditures in campaigns for federal
office. They do not repeal or suspend the "equal time" provision of the

Federal Communications Act. 2 They do not provide free or publicly
subsidized broadcast time for political candidates.13 They do not pro-

vide reduced-rate mailing privileges for federal candidates," and they do

not provide for an independent Federal Elections Commission. 5 These
are some of the more important omissions, the significance of which will
86
be considered below.

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ELECTIONS

While it is generally assumed that Congress has ample constitutional power to regulate federal elections, 87 it would be instructive to
examine the cases on which such assumptions rest since there is no
express constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate presidential elections, 8 and the authority for congressional power to regulate
congressional elections appears to be fairly narrow. 9
In the only Supreme Court case directly in point, Burroughs and
Cannon v. United States,8" the Court held congressional power over the
"Revenue
Act § 801, 85 Stat. 571, to be codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9012(b)(1).
"1 Revenue Act § 801, 85 Stat. 572, to be codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9012(b)(2).
"The Senate version of S.382, 92d Cong., IstSess. § 315(a) (1971), did contain such a
provision, but it was dropped in conference. See H.R. REP. No. 92-752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1971).
"The Udall-Anderson Bill, H.R. 5092, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), would have contained
such a provision.
"The Anderson-Udall Bill, H.R. 5093, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971), would have done so for
congressional candidates.
"The Senate version of S. 382, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. § 310 (1971), did contain such a provision,
but it was deleted in conference. See H.R. REP. No. 92-752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1971).
Such an agency would also have been established by the Scott-Mathias Bill, S.956, 92d Cong.,
Ist
Sess. (1971) and the Gravel-Pearson-Randolph Bill, S.1 & S.9, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971).
"See text accompanying notes 472-75 infra.
"See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 635-40 (1970); A. ROSENTHAL,
supra note 12, at 12-19; Lobel, FederalControl of Campaign Contributions,51 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1966); Note, Statutory Regulation of PoliticalCampaign Funds, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1259 (1953).
"U.S. CONST. art. II,

§

1.

"'See text accompanying notes 95-104 infra.
"0290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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presidential election process sufficiently broad to sustain a requirement
that presidential election political committees operating in two or more
states keep full records of contributions and expenditures and report
them to the Clerk of the House of Representatives." The Court relied
on the rationale that since presidential electors exercise functions under
and perform duties by virtue of the Constitution, and since the President
is charged with the "executive power of the nation," presidential elections are too important to the "welfare and safety of the whole people"
for Congress to be unable to protect them "from the improper use of
money." 92 It then proceeded to quote two full pages from the decision
in Ex parte Yarbrough, 3 despite the fact that that case dealt with
congressional power to regulate congressionalelections,94 which involves
an entirely different constitutional position.
The power of Congress to regulate congressional elections is much
more explicit, but some stretching is required in order to validate its
extension to matters involving contributions and expenditures:
The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

What is required is an expansive definition of "Manner," and the Court
has obliged repeatedly. Starting with Ex parte Siebold0 in 1879, in
which "Manner" was held to include authority to provide for election
marshalls to supervise congressional elections, the Court has sustained
a series of congressional acts regulating congressional elections. In Ex
parte Yarbrough,97 it sustained provisions protecting voters from intimidation, threat, force, or hindrance with respect to the exercise of their
votes. In two cases, UnitedStates v. CIO" and UnitedStates v. UA W,19
the Court refused to consider the constitutionality of the provision barring labor union political contributions or expenditures,' 9 never discuss9'Federal Corrupt Practices Act §§ 302-05, 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-44 (1970).
11290 U.S. at 545.
I110
U.S. 651 (1884).

"1290 U.S. at 546-47.
"U.S. CONST. art I, § 4.
9'100 U.S. 371 (1879).

"110 U.S. 651 (1884). In addition, see United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915), holding
the same provisions to include the right to have one's vote counted and reported honestly.
98335 U.S. 106 (1948).
"1352 U.S. 567 (1957).

"'In the CIO case the Court held a front page editorial in the C.LO. News by Philip Murray,
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ing the question of congressional authority, and in only one case has the
Court invalidated a congressional enactment under the "Times, Places,
and Manner" clause. In Newberry v. United States,'0' it held that con-

gressional power did not extend to the regulation of primaries. 02 It then
03
proceeded essentially to reverse itself in United States v. Classic,

which involved the altering and false certification of votes in a congressional primary.0 4
The Court has given a broad scope to congressional power in regulating congressional elections"0 5 and it would appear too late for the
Court to define "Manner" to exclude the reporting requirements on
contributions and expenditures, despite the fact that a persuasive argument can be made for the narrow definition. The thread that runs

through the cases in point involves threats, physical violence, coercion,
bribery, and fraudulent acts that occurred in the voting process itself,

and it is quite a jump from that kind of corrupt practice-'the kind that
is inherently wrong-to the governmental scrutiny and restriction of
activities which are not only not wrong in themselves, but which are
actively encouraged, such as contributing to political candidates.
It is equally clear that Congress has no direct plenary power to

regulate state and local elections.'

But if the election is one at which

both federal and state officials are to be chosen, it is within the power

of Congress to regulate0 7 even if the allegedly illegal act involved was
intended primarily to influence the non-federal election. 08
Congress may, however, preempt authority to regulate some dimensions of state, local, and federal elections by deriving the regulatory
the president of the CIO,endorsing a candidate for Congress, not to be within the scope of the
criminal provision. In the UA W case, the Court reversed a district court dismissal of an indictment
of the UAW for purchasing television time for broadcasts in behalf of congressional candidates
and remanded for trial on the merits.
101256 U.S. 232 (1921); cf United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1916).
'It did so because primaries were unknown at the time of the Constitution.
1313 U.S. 229 (1941).
"'The Court tried to distinguish Newberry by pointing out that only four justices in that case
had held squarely that "elections" did not include primaries on the ground that primaries were
unknown at the time of the Constitution. A fifth justice had so held for different reasons. See
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941). Suffice it to say that it is not a convincing
distinction. See also two other primary cases, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and Smith v.
AIlwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
"05285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
"'Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 314 (1894);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
"'7Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884).
"113nre Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
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power from the nature of particular kinds of actors or particular kinds
of state and federal transactions, rather than from any broad congressional power to regulate elections themselves. Thus Congress has successfully prohibited specific kinds of individuals and organizations over
whom it has some authority by virtue of other reasons-federal employment,"0 9 employment by other governmental units with federal funds,11
federal officeholding,"' activity occurring on federal premises,"'
federal regulation under the interstate commerce clause,"' or federal
chartering" 4-from engaging in certain kinds of political activity, including that affecting non-federal elections.
In addition, the Supreme Court may find that other constitutional
provisions affect state and local elections. The equal protection and
appropriate legislation clauses of the fourteenth amendment have been
used directly to invalidate discriminatory electoral provisions in such
areas as primary elections on the basis of race," 5 election literacy
tests,"1 ' election poll taxes,"' malapportionment of state legislative voting districts,"' discrimination against minor parties' access to the ballot
in presidential elections, "9 and discrimination against candidates for a
state constitutional convention.' Congress also has the power to prevent any denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude under the fifteenth amendment,
"eUnited Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
But see National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578
(D.D.C. 1972).
"'Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
"'United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); Brehm v. United States, 196 F.2d 769
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
"'United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39 (1908).
"'Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943), involving
a public utility holding company.
"'United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971), held the congressional prohibition unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited national banks from making
bona fide loans to creditworthy borrowers for political purposes.
"'Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
"'Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
"'Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"'E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). This is admittedly a different situation because it
involved a presidential election. But the case holding is technically in point in that it invalidated a
state law dealing with elections on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause. Cf.
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). See also Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969).
"'Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S,
909 (1971); Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969).
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and its exercise has been sustained recently."'
Congress has exercised its authority to regulate various facets of
elections for over 125 years. In 1842 it enacted a law requiring the
election of congressmen by geographical districts."' In 1866 it established the mode and time of electing senators.123 Then in 1870 it enacted
a comprehensive code of regulations governing the manner of conducting congressional elections, including provisions against false registration, bribery, voting without legal right, making false election returns,
interfering with election officers, and so on. 24 Apparently dissatisfied
with the results, Congress repealed the entire code in 1894.121
Following considerable public concern over the influence of corporate money in elections, Congress in 19.07 passed the first prohibition
against corporate political involvement. 2 Every corporation was prohibited from making any money contribution in federal elections, and
any corporation organized under federal law was prohibited from making such a contribution in any election, whether local, state, or federal.
Three years later Congress enacted the first contribution and expenditure disclosure law, which was applicable only to committees operating
in two or more states in congressional campaigns and to individuals who
made direct expenditures of more than fifty dollars in such elections.2 7
In 1911 an expenditure ceiling in nomination and election campaigns
was imposed on all congressional candidates, the first ever to be enacted
by Congress.'2 That act also required all congressional candidates to file
reports on their campaign finances and proscribed the offering of employment as an inducement to obtain support in elections' 2 All of these
provisions were reenacted and codified in the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925,11 which made only one significant change: it expanded the
proscription on corporate contributions from "money" contributions
to contributions of "anything of value." In 1939 Congress passed the
2ISoutlfi Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).

'1Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491.
'"Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 245, 14 Stat. 243.
'4Act of June 1, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 19-22, 16 Stat. 144-46; Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, §§ 56, 16 Stat. 255-56.
1
2'Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36. For one explanation of the reasons, see United States
v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1917).

"'Act of Jan. 26, 1906, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
'"Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822.
"'Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25.
122d.

'Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.).
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Hatch Act, which prevents federal employees from engaging in partisan
political activity.131 The following year it placed a contribution and
expenditure ceiling of three million dollars on political committees operating in two or more states in a presidential campaign and required such
committees to report all expenditures and contributions to the Clerk of
the House. The same act imposed the first limit on individual contributions: 5,000 dollars in any calendar
year with respect to any nomination
3
or election for federal office.1 1
In 1943, in the War Labor Disputes Act 33 Congress temporarily
extended to labor unions the ban on corporate political contributions in
federal elections. Finally, in 1947 the Labor Management Relations Act
made the labor union contribution prohibition permanent and expanded
it (as well as the corporate prohibition) to include a ban on direct
political expenditures as well. 34 The same act broadened the prohibitions to include activities in connection with primaries, conventions, and
caucuses.' 35 There the laws remained until 1971.
Even though Congress hasassumed a great deal of authority to deal
with some aspects of the election process, the exercise of that authority
is not unlimited, but is subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The chief constitutional restraint that bears on the 1971 legislation is
the first amendment, and it would be useful to explore briefly the guidelines which courts and scholars have developed for interpreting it.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first amendment embodies individual rights which constitute
3
the core of our form of democratic society: 0
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 3 '
There are generally considered to be two primary schools of inter"'Act
"'Act
"'Act
"'Act

of
of
of
of

Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53
July 19, 1940, ch. 640, §§
June 25, 1943, ch. 144, §
June 23, 1947, ch. 120, §

Stat. 1147.
13, 20, 54 Stat. 770, 772.
9, 57 Stat. 167.
304, 61 Stat. 159.

"'For a fuller summary of the background of these legislative provisions see United States
v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.).

"'Meiklejohn, supra note 13. In addition, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939):
"[The first amendment lies] at the foundation of free government by free men."
"'U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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pretation of the first amendment: those who hold the rights guaranteed
to be absolute and self-defining and those who balance those rights with
any social or individual interests involved.'38 This dichotomy, although
widely utilized, fails to make clear what its language suggests, obscures
more than it illuminates, and makes analysis even more difficult than
it must be.' Because it nonetheless is used by courts and scholars alike
and provides a convenient shorthand way of referring to the general
alternative positions, it is a good starting point for a short discussion
of the first amendment.
The foremost judicial absolutist was the late Justice Black, who put
his position as follows:
I do not subscribe to that [balancing] doctrine for I believe that the
First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the "balancing" that was
to be done in this field. The history of the First Amendment is too well
known to require repeating here except to say that it certainly cannot
be denied that the very object of adopting the First Amendment, as
well as the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was to put the
freedoms protected there completely out of the area of any congressional control that may be attempted through the exercise of precisely
those powers that are now being used to "balance" the Bill of Rights
4
out of existence.1 0
Despite this language Justice Black was not really a thoroughgoing
absolutist.14 ' Only those laws which are aimed directly at curtailing the
guaranteed freedoms are subject to his absolutist ban, not those which
are aimed at other activity and only incidentally affect first amendment
freedoms:
There are, of course, cases suggesting that a law which primarily regulates conduct but which might also indirectly affect speech can be
upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for
control of the conduct. With these cases I agree. . . . But [they did
not] even remotely suggest that a law directly aimed at curtailing
'1'See, e.g., Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1965).
131Meiklejohn, supra note 13, at 248-52. See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Freund, Mr. JusticeBlack and the JudicialFunction,
14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 467, 471 (1967).

" 0Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
MMeiklejohn, supra note 13, at 251.
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speech and political persuasion could be saved through a balancing
2

process.11

The majority of the Court has never adopted Justice Black's view
and, indeed, has expressly rejected it."' It has usually first divided the
precedents into two classes: those which are considered outside first
amendment protection generally and those which are within it but require balancing of individual and governmental interests.'"
In performing its balancing act, the Court has allocated to one or
another side of the balance several formulations of the criterial weights
it was employing. Sometimes it will elevate the rights side of the balance
by declaring it to be in a "preferred position," ' to require "breathing
space to survive," ' or to "rest on firmer foundation." 4 ' At other times,
it will raise the governmental or social interest side of the balance by
stressing the "overriding and compelling" interest of the state,"' the
incidental, rather than direct impact on the protected freedom, or the
"clear and present danger" ' involved in failing to defer to it. While it
has been suggested that the "clear and present danger" test has been
"'Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-42 (1959) (dissenting opinion). On Justice
Black's "directly-indirectly" distinction, see Freund, supra note 139, at 471-72.
'"Brennan, supra note 138, at 5; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1960) (footnote
omitted): "At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... as protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes,' not only in the undoubted sense that
where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of
that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment."
"'Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1960); see Emerson, supra note 139, at 912:
"The formula is that the court must, in each case, balance the individual and social interest in
freedom of expression against the social interest sought by the regulation which restricts expression."
"'Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
But see Kovacs v. Cooper, supra at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring): "My brother Reed speaks of
the 'preferred position of freedom of speech' though, to be sure, he finds that the Trenton ordinance
does not disregard it. This is a phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this
Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought which it may subtly imply, that
any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity." The phrase probably
entered literature in Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942). See
also Cahn, The Firstness of the FirstAmendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956).
"'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
"'Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
"'Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
"'Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In addition, see Dennis, 341 U.S. 494,
510 (1951), where the Court, quoting Judge Learned Hand, said: "'In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' 183 F.2d at 212. We adopt this statement of the rule."
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abandoned 5 ' and has little validity today,"' the weighing which it labeled is still very much the current practice.
At still other times, the Court looks at neither the individual nor
the governmental interests involved, but at the means chosen to achieve
the governmental interest. At such times, the Court focuses on the
"chilling effect" of the means chosen upon the exercise of protected
rights 1 2 by determining whether those means are suitably limited to the
achievement of the valid governmental interest. It seeks to determine if
the means chosen are "precise '15 and have a narrowly specific focus, 5 4
or are vague, overbroad, and unlimited and indiscriminate in their
sweep."' It also probes to see if there are "less drastic means" of serving
the legitimate state interest involved. 50 A persuasive argument has been
made to the effect that it is in this "means test" that the crux of the
"balancing" occurs:
A scale which puts in one pan the public interest in some legitimate
end of government-national security, civil peace, or preservation of
the machinery of justice-rather than the interest in a particular means
to that end will rarely tip in favor of competing values. Since the court
has in fact allowed first amendment values to prevail even when the
end pursued by the government was urgent, it must do its balancing
at the margin-that is, it must balance no more than the state's interest
in the added effectiveness of the chosen means against the individual
interest in the use of less drastic ones. . .By some process or another,
'"See Meiklejohn, supra note 13, at 249.
"'See Brennan, supra note 138, at 8; McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1182, 1209-11 (1959); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,450-54 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
"'Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345, said:
"We have molded both substantive rights and procedural remedies in the face of varied conflicting
interests to conform to our overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the chilling effect' upon
exercise of First Amendment freedoms generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion to limit their exercise." See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate
and practice"); Comment, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 82226 (1969).
"1Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
"'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
"'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 388 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 389 U.S. 11
(1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960). See also Comment, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844
(1970).
"'Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); accord, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967).
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then, the Justices must estimate how much less effective various alternative means would be, how much more they would cost-not merely
in terms of the resources they would require, but also in terms of their
effects upon other non-first amendment social values-and measure
against accompanying gains these losses to expression, association,
and belief.'57
Sometimes, especially of late, the Court, seemingly growing sensitive to the accusation that it is balancing away protected rights, declares
that it is not balancing at all:
In making this determination we have found it necessary to measure
the validity of the means adopted by Congress against both the goal it
has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First Amendment. But we have in no way "balanced" these respective interests. We
have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the conflict between
congressional power and individual rights be accomodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict.'
This new formula of "narrow accommodation" is certainly descriptive of what the Court does once, on balance, it finds the governmental
interest worthy of protection. However, if this new test is applied without a prior "balancing," it opens the door to almost any kind of restriction on first amendment rights, because once the interests on both sides
of the balance are accorded validity, any means can be "narrowly accommodated" to an end.
Despite all the rhetoric about "balancing," the Court seems to
engage in a four-step analysis. First, it classifies the individual right
being asserted into one of three classes: (1) absolutely unprotected
speech, such as non-public affairs libel and whatever the Court chooses
to call "obscenity"; (2) absolutely protected speech, such as that pure
and simple speech directly banned by sedition laws; and (3) presumptively protected speech, such as all other kinds of speech, association,
17Comment, Less DrasticMeans andthe FirstAmendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 467-68 (1969).
reunited States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967). The language of "accommodation"

has been used before. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.):
"Accommodation of these contending principles-the one underlying the power of Congress to
investigate, the other at the basis of the limitation imposed by the First Amendment .,.." But
in no place other than Robel does the Court explicitly oppose the concepts of "accomodation"

and "balancing." Note also that Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72, 84 (1959), described the task similarly: "But where the exercise of the investigatory power
collides with constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, that power too has inevitable limitations, and
the delicate and always difficult accommodation of the two with minimum sacrifice of either is
the hard task of the judiciary and ultimately of this Court."
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petition, and assembly. Secondly, with respect to presumptively protected speech, it evaluates and weights the particular freedom for which
protection is sought. Thirdly, it evaluates and weights the governmental
interest being asserted against it. Finally, it attempts to measure the
means chosen in two ways: by evaluating the extent of their negative
impact on the rights claimed and by assessing their reasonable relationship to, and comparative efficiency in serving, the legitimate governmental interest. Because this seems a little clearer formulation of what
the Court actually does in first amendment cases, this is the framework
to be applied to the provisions of the Campaign Act.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

If free speech is "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other form of freedom," '59 free political speech is its crown and
guarantor. Indeed, Alexander Meiklejohn has urged that the first
amendment rights constitute the quintessence of democratic selfgovernment and that the people have reserved to themselves absolute
freedom in the exercise of those rights and have forbidden their government to intrude on that free exercise in any way. 60 The Supreme Court
has spoken similarly concerning the purposes of the first amendment:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of' the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates,
structures of government, the manner in which government is operated
or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.'
It would seem, therefore, that first amendment protection of participation in politics would be ironclad against any intrusion; but even the
absolutists would not grant it a complete immunity from governmental
regulation. 62 While the absolutists would clearly not permit as much
regulation as the balancers, the rationale employed by both schools of
interpretation would be the same. All would argue that while political
freedom constitutes perhaps the most preferred exercise of the first
amendment rights, the government's obligation to maintain the purity
"'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
16'Meiklejohn, supra note 13, at 255-56.
"'Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
'"See text accompanying note 142 infra.
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of the election process has an equally elevated status. That governmental power, however it is constitutionally derived, can be rationalized in
a variety of ways: as necessary to safeguard the effectiveness of the
citizen's own first amendment political rights, as self-protection by the
government, or as merely self-evident.' Thus the abridgement of some
first amendment rights, which, when directed to non-political ends
would be quickly struck down, may find a valid governmental purpose
in the protection of the integrity of elections. This is, of course, not to
say that any means employed by Congress would be justified by the
compelling nature of the governmental interest; the character of the
means used is the determining factor in the analysis. The exceedingly
difficult task for the courts is to determine which kinds of political
freedom can be constitutionally circumscribed in which ways and to
achieve which governmental purposes.
Let us examine in that light two of the central features of the
Campaign Act: the contribution disclosure requirements and the monetary limitations imposed on candidates in the amount he or his family
can contribute to his campaign and in the amount he can spend on
communications media in his campaign.
DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The Right of Privacy in the Exercise of First Amendment Freedom
The Precedentsfor the Right. That there is a first amendment right
to free and unhindered political expression and activity can hardly be
doubted. What is at issue here is the amplitude of that right and the
extent to which compelled disclosure entrenches upon it. Is the making
of a political contribution constitutionally protected from government
scrutiny and from forced disclosure to the public? Is it, in other words,
within the protection of a right to privacy of political belief or of a right
to privacy of political association? In view of the obviousness of the
question and the fact that contribution disclosure has been part of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act for nearly fifty years, it is astonishing
that the Supreme Court has not addressed it directly in a single case," 4
not even in the leading corrupt practices case of Burroughs and Cannon
v. UnitedStates. 5 While there are, therefore, no cases directly in point,
there are six different major lines of cases which involve the immunity
"'See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1884).

"I4T. EMERSON, supranote 87, at 635.
1-290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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of the first amendment freedoms of speech, press, assembly, petition,
and religion from official inquiry, regulation, and disclosure and which
bear closely on our question. In defining the scope of a right to privacy
for campaign contributions, cases that have arisen in the following areas
must be considered: (1) the privacy of political speech, belief, and association (governmental regulation of and inquiry into the personal and
organizational affairs of those suspected of using or advocating violence
or the violent overthrow of the government or of those who are agents
of foreign powers); (2) privacy of association for socioeconomic change
(the NAACP cases); (3) privacy of political and religious speech (the
municipal and state licensing of public speeches, soliciting, and handbill
distribution); (4) privacy of the press; (5) privacy of speech and petition
(the lobbying cases); and (6) privacy of political activity (the corrupt
practices cases).
The first group of cases grew out of attempts by Congress and state
legislatures to deter through disclosure the activities of Communists,
agents of foreign principals, and members of the Ku Klux Klan. The
legislative means to this end have included registration statutes,, " provisions making membership in certain organizations illegal or attaching
severe burdens to such membership, and legislative investigations of
"subversive" activities. The registration statutes, with the exception of
those involving the attempt by Southern states to compel disclosure by
the NAACP,1 7 have been upheld against first amendment attack. "
When the registration necessarily results in revelation of conduct punishable under the criminal laws, however, the Court has invalidated the
registration requirement on the ground that it violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." 9 The provisions conditioning
eligibility for public employment or for certain public benefits on oaths
'"Voorhis Anti-Subversive Activities Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1970); Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1970); Communist Control Act, 50 U.S.C. g 841-44 (1970);
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (McCarran Act), ch. 1024, §§ 7-9, 64 Stat. 993-96; Alien
Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act), ch. 439, tit. III, 54 Stat. 673-76 (now 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-06
(1970); N.Y. Civ. RXiciTs LAW §§ 53-54 (McKinney 1948) (the Walker Law, providing that certain
organizations, which require an oath as a condition of membership, must register and file a list of
members; directed at the Ku Klux Klan).
"'See text and accompanying notes 174-76 infra.
"'Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (sustaining the registration provisions of the Smith Act); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943) (sustaining the
Foreign Agents Registration Act, but limiting the required disclosure only to those activities
actually engaged in on behalf of a foreign principal); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U.S. 63 (1929) (sustaining New York's Walker Law, discussed note 166 supra).
"'Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
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of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow or nonmembership in organizations advocating violent overthrow were generally sustained in the earlier cases, 70 but more recently have been struck down as overbroad in
their infringement of first amendment rights.'

Legislative investiga-

tions of subversion have similarly found a mixed response in the courts,
with half the leading cases sustaining the particular inquiry 72 and half
170E.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), sustaining the refusal of the Illinois State Bar to
admit Anastaplo to membership on grounds of his refusal to answer questions about membership
in the Communist Party, an organization on the Attorney General's list.
'United States v. Robel, 359 U.S. 258 (1967) (invalidating as overbroad the provision of the
Subversive Activities Control Act making it illegal for a member of the Communist Party to be
employed in an enterprise designated by the Secretary of Defense as a "defense facility"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating as overbroad New York statutory
provisions barring state employment to members of organizations listed as subversive); Dennis v,
United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) (reversing on procedural grounds convictions of union officers
for conspiring to obtain access to NLRB services by filing false Communist Party non-membership
affidavits); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (invalidating an Arizona affirmative loyalty
oath for state employees which had been interpreted by the Arizona legislature to prohibit membership in the Communist Party); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (invalidating as a bill
of attainder 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970), a law making it a crime for a Communist Party member to
serve as an officer or employee of a labor union); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (invalidating two Washington state oaths-one an affirmative oath to " ' promote respect for the flag'" and
governmental institutions, " ' reveren ce for law and order and undivided allegiance to the government,'" id. at 362, and the other a disclaimer of being a "subversive," or member of a subversive
organization); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (invalidating a Florida
provision requiring state employees to swear that they had never lent "'aid, support, advice,
counsel or influence to the Communist Party,'" id. at 279); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(invalidating an Arkansas law requiring all public school teachers to file annually an affidavit
listing all organizations-political, religious, fraternal, and social-to which they had belonged or
contributed within five years); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating a California
statute requiring a non-overthrow oath as a prerequisite to obtaining a veteran's property tax
exemption); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) invalidating a provision of
New York City Charter Amendment relating to questions about plaintiff's official conduct);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating an Oklahoma non-membership oath that
was required irrespective of knowldge of the purpose of the organization).
'2Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961) (sustaining a contempt conviction for defendant's refusal to answer many of the questions put to him by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (sustaining a contempt
conviction for defendant's refusal to answer all questions put to him by the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, on grounds that the questions were clearly within the scope of a valid
legislative inquiry authorized by Congress); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (sustaining a
contempt conviction for refusal to reveal to the Attorney General of New Hampshire the names
of guests at a "World Fellowship" camp, on the grounds that there was a legitimate state interest
in protecting itself from subversion and a sufficient nexus between defendant and the area being
investigated); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (sustaining a contempt conviction
of a university instructor for refusal to answer questions put by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities regarding his present and past membership in the Communist Party, on
grounds that those activities were legitimately within the scope of congressional inquiry and that
there was probable cause for the committee to seek to question him in relation to them).
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of them invalidating it.
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All of these cases presented issues involving

the freedom and privacy of political belief and association, and in all of

them the Court recognized the existence and importance of those rights,
even when it found an overriding governmental interest sufficient to

warrant intrusion upon them.

The NAACP cases1 74 presented the same issues in purer form,

except that the association for which privacy from governmental intrusion was being sought was socioeconomic rather than political in nature.'75 Because of the socioeconomic nature of the association, it is all

the more significant that the Court invariably protected its privacy,
going so far as to create, in the view of some commentators, a new first

amendment right of freedom of association. 17 The fact that the Court
was able to reach its conclusions because it found a nonexistent or

insufficiently compelling governmental interest to balance against the
privacy of association should not seriously diminish the significance of
the private right it proclaimed.
1"DeGregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966) (reversing a contempt conviction for
refusal to answer questions put by the Attorney General of New Hampshire about past Communist
activities); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (reversing a
contempt conviction of the president of the Miami branch of the NAACP for refusal to give branch
membership lists to a Florida Legislative Investigation Committee); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957) (reversing a contempt conviction for refusal to answer questions put by the
Attorney General of New Hampshire regarding recent lectures); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957) (reversing contempt conviction for refusal to answer questions about the activities
of others who had been associated in the Communist Party functions in the past, but who had
ceased activity).
'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating a Virginia anti-barratry statute under
which NAACP feared prosecution for urging its members to bring court suits for violations of their
rights); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (sustaining the refusal of
the NAACP to furnish the Louisiana Secretary of State a membership list required annually by
statute of certain kinds of organizations doing business in Louisiana); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (unanimously sustaining the refusal of two local NAACP branches to
comply with occupation license tax ordinances insofar as they required any organizations operating
within the cities involved to furnish to the city clerk a statement listing those paying dues, assessments or contributions on grounds that the cities "failed to demonstrate a controlling justification
for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the membership lists would
cause," id. at 527); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (unanimously sustaining the refusal
of the NAACP to comply with an order to furnish its membership lists, on the ground that the
state had shown an insufficient legitimate interest required to override the deterrence to freedom
of association which would be caused by revealing the membership lists). See also Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
"'The Court viewed both kinds of organizations as entitled to protection. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
"8Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 1-3 (1964),
and authorities cited therein. See also Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory
Disclosureof Membership, 58 COLuM. L. REv. 614 (1958).
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The issue presented by the licensign cases is also closely related to

the question of privacy of first amendment rights. But while registration
or legislative inquiry occurs after, or concurrent with, the exercise of a
first amendment freedom, licensing occurs before its exercise. Both licensing and registraiton imply that government permission must be
obtained for the exercise of a freedom not in principle within government's power to give or deny, and both involve governmental intrusion
on the privacy of the exercise of first amendment rights, but the prior
restraint of licensing is obviously the more onerous. In these cases the
Court has had to decide whether the government could require an individual to obtain a license as a prerequisite to engaging in activities
presumably protected by the freedoms of speech, assembly, petition,

and religion. While the cases have turned mainly on the latitude of
discretionary authority to refuse permission and have found fault with
licensing because it is a prior restraint, the disclosure to public authority
inherent in licensing has been implicit in the Court's concern. Only a
few of the leading cases have sustained the licensing;"' most have invalidated it.178 The privacy dimension of the handbill-distribution-licensing
cases surfaced in Talley v. California,79 the most recent case in the
'nPoulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-76 (1941) (sustaining a statute which required a license and fee for parades; it had been
narrowly construed by the state courts to permit refusal only for "considerations of time, place,
and manner so as to conserve the public convenience").
t8
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (invalidating an ordinance requiring a permit
from the mayor and city council in order to solicit union membership); Kuntz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating an ordinance requiring a permit from the police commissioner in
order to hold public religious meetings on the streets, as applied to a Baptist minister whose earlier
license had been revoked because he allegedly ridiculed other religions at one of his services);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (invalidating a Texas statute that required labor organizers
to register with the Secretary of State, from whom one would receive an "organizer's card" in order
to solicit members); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (invalidating an ordinance requiring a
permit from the mayor, who could refuse it if he deemed it " 'proper or advisable,'" id. at 419
n.l, to do so); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a statute requiring a
license from the secretary of the public welfare council, who had discretion in determining whether
the cause was "religious," as applied to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who were selling and
giving away pamphlets); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating ordinances
that banned the distribution of literature in the public streets and invalidating an ordinance requiring a license to be obtained from the chief of police, who had wide discretion to refuse); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (invalidating an ordinance requiring a permit to be obtained for meeting
in public places, which could be refused only "'for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances,
or disorderly assemblage,'" id. at 502 n.l, where the ordinance had in fact been used arbitrarily
to suppress free discussion of public issues); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (invalidating an ordinance requiring the city manager's permission for distributing literature as applied to
a member of Jehovah's Witnesses wishing to distribute religious tracts).
1'362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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sequence, which invalidated on privacy grounds a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting distribution of "any handbill in any place under any
circumstances," unless it had printed on it the names and addresses of
the persons who prepared, distributed, or sponsored it. The Court noted
that it had already held similar absolute bans unconstitutional' and
regarded the addition of an identification requirement as a condition of
distribution as "tend[ing] to restrict freedom to distribute information
and thereby freedom of expression."18 1 The Court then went on to emphasize the potential importance of anonymity in expression and concluded that "identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussions of public matters of importance." '
The fourth category is that of registration of the press, with the
concomitant infringement of the privacy of editors and owners. In the
Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912,183 Congress conditioned the
granting of "the privileges of the mail" to newspapers, magazines, and
other periodicals on their filing with the Postmaster General and their
publishing semi-annually in their pages, the names of their editors, officers, and owners. This condition was attacked in Lewis Publishing Co.
v. Morgan,1 4 as a violation of freedom of the press:
The compulsory disclosure to the public of the circulation of a newspaper is calculated to impair its influence and violate the privacy of its
business. By compelling a public disclosure of the editors and owners
of newspapers, the right to disseminate ideas impersonally is distorted.'1
In deciding that the condition constituted regulation of the mails rather
'Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
Compare Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting the use

of sound amplifiers in public places without the permission of the chief of police, on grounds of
the absence of standards for the exercise of his discretion) with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77

(1949) (sustaining an ordinance absolutely prohibiting the use of sound trucks on any city street).
But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (sustaining an ordinance prohibiting

house-to-house solicitation for commercial purposes without obtaining advance approval of house
occupants, as applied to magazine subscription solicitors); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942) (sustaining an ordinance which prohibited distribution of commercial advertising on public
streets, when a non-commercial, public interest-oriented part of the handbill had been added in
order to evade the ordinance). See also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidat-

ing an ordinance forbidding knocking on doors and ringing doorbells in order to deliver handbills,
when applied to a member of Jehovah's Witnesses).

281362 U.S. at 64.
'"Id. at 65.

"'Ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 553-54.
1-229 U.S. 288 (1913).

Imd. at 292 (argument for appellant).
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than of the press, the Court utilized the right-privilege distinction, which
has been discredited by subsequent decisions. 8 In view of Lamont v.
PostmasterGeneral,8 7 Lewis Publishingmust be regarded as of exceedingly doubtful vitality.
The lobbying cases involve the privacy of exercise of the freedoms
of petition and speech. In United States v. Rumely85 and United States
v. Harriss,19 the only two cases to reach the Supreme Court, the issue
was presented in quite different circumstances. Rumely reviewed a contempt conviction arising out of a congressional investigation of lobbying, while in Harriss the defendants were charged with failure to register and report contributions and expenditures under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.' The defendant in Rumely was Secretary of
the Committee for Constitutional Government, which was engaged, as
Justice Frankfurter put it, "in the sale of books of a particular political
tendentiousness,"'' and he had refused to reveal to the House Select
Committee on Lobbying the names of those who had made bulk purchases of tracts from his organization. The defendants in Harriss,
however, had been engaged to contact members of Congress either
personally, through hired lobbyists, or through a letter-writing campaign. Both cases turned, therefore, on the question of what constitutes
"lobbying," and in both the Court construed it as narrowly as possible
to mean "'lobbying in its commonly accepted sense,' that is, 'representations made directly to Congress, its members, or its committees.' "I02
Rumely's activities were consequently outside the scope of the Committee's authorizing resolution and immune from inquiry, just as some of
the Harrissdefendants were outside the scope of regulation of the Act.
The Court went to such pains because to give the word a "broader
application to organizations seeking to propagandize the general public" ' might infringe the exercise of the first amendment." 4 To require
"'Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
"-381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding that the use of the mails cannot be conditioned upon unconstitutional burdens; the burden in that case was self-identification by post-card in order to receive
foreign communist propaganda).
1"345 U.S. 41 (1953).
"-347 U.S. 612 (1954).
"-2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1970).
1"'345 U.S. at 42.
1111d. at 47, quoting from the lower court opinion in the same case, 197 F.2d 116, 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1952).
"'United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 621 (1954).
"'See id. at 630-33 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953).
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those engaged in direct lobbying of Congress, however, to reveal "the
real principals behind those who come to Congress (or get others to do
so) and speak as though they represent the public intrest, when in fact
they are undisclosed agents of special groups,"1 15 is justified since it
enables members of Congress to evaluate accurately the pressures
brought to bear upon them. 90
The final group of cases is comprised of those dealing with the
regulation of the heart of political activity: the election and campaign
process. These involved regulation of the kinds of activities which are
either not within the scope of first amendment protection, such as bribery and intimidation of voters, or simply concern general supervisory
authority over elections. It is worth noting again that Burroughs and
Cannon v. United States,9 7 the one case sustaining the power of Congress to require registration of political committees and disclosure of
political contributions, did not consider the impact of such disclosure
on the privacy of first amendment exercise. In only one group of corrupt
practices cases-those dealing with the constitutionality of the state198
and federal' laws requiring political handbills to be signed-has the
question of first amendment privacy been raised, but in all of them
(none of which reached the Supreme Court) the statutes have been
sustained."'0 The only case raising a similar issue to reach the Supreme
0 ' but the handbill that caused the ordiCourt was Talley v. California,"
nance there to be struck down was not one that dealt with a political
campaign. While the Court's reasoning would certainly embrace political handbills within the scope of its language and while Justice Clark's
dissent there relied on the existence, and the implied constitutionality
of, the bans on anonymous political handbills, 2 2 the Court must be said
never to have decided the issue.
Extending the Right to Campaign Contributions.As an initial as"'United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 632 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111d. at 625. The Court did not consciously describe what it was doing as "balancing," because

that word was not to come into vogue with the Court for another several years. But a careful
reading of the case makes it absolutely clear that "balancing" is what the Court actually did.
'290 U.S. 534 (1934).
"'In 1960 thirty-six states had such statutes. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 70 n.2 (1960)

(Clark, J., dissenting).
19218 U.S.C. § 612 (1970).
2"United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961); Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal.

2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (invalidating the statute on other grounds): State v. Babst,
104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922).
-'362 U.S. 60 (1960).
=id. at 68.
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sumption, legitimate political activity, peacefully pursued according to
the laws prescribed therefor, is privileged and not subject to governmental registration, disclosure, or scrutiny. Justice Frankfurter put it this
way in his concurring opinion in Sweezy:
But the inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind
of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the
basis of so meagre a countervailing interest ...
In the political realm, as in the academic, thought and action are
presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority. It cannot require argument that inquiry would be barred to ascertain
whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of the two major
parties, either in a state or national election."0 3
Thus not only the secrecy of the ballot itself,"4 but also a citizen's
political loyalties are protected. The importance of that right to privacy
of political affiliations is underscored by the Court's creation of an
independent right of privacy of association:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,
as"this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. . . . It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
which embraces freedom of speech. . . . It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were
thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional rights
there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations ...
Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in
2OSweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265-66 (1957). It goes without saying that the
absolutists would go even further and would not give any weight to a countervailing governmental
interest: "Moreover, we believe ... that First Amendment rights are beyond abridgement either
by legislation that directly restrains their exercise or by suppression or by impairment through
harassment, humiliation, or exposure by government." Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
528 (1960) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
2"For the history of the development of privacy surrounding balloting in this country, see
Nutting, Freedom ofSilence: ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst GovernmentalIntrusion in Political Affairs, 47 MICH. L. REv. 181, 181-92 (1948).
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advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly when a
group espouses dissident beliefs."0 5
It is clear that the Court views the right to privacy in association as
involving more than political associations.2 1If the Court will protect the
privacy of organizations less directly related to the central meaning of
the first amendment from infringement by registration and disclosure
statutes"' and legislative investigations,2 8 then a fortiori it should protect the privacy of avowedly political organizations.
It can be argued that contributing money to an association is not
the same as being a member of it and that the former act goes beyond
the membership that is protected by the privacy of political association
that has been given protection by the Court. But, in Bates and
Rumely,0 9 the Court extended first amendment protection also to contributors and pointed out in NAACP v. Alabama2 10 that it was the
individual's right to express his ideas freely through organizations that
21
was being protected, not any rights of the associations themselves. If
the Court has protected organizations from disclosure of contributions,
it follows that it should also protect individuals contributing to a political campaign, even if the loose and ad hoc association for a political
campaign does not formally constitute an association.
Extending first amendment protection to contributions indicates
that making a contribution is considered by the Court to be a kind of
speech, or at the narrowest, an activity that furthers and is necessary to
the protection of free speech and association. It is obvious that the latter
could not exist without the funds required to sustain it.
There are three major exceptions to the protection of the privacy
of political associations. The first is that kind of political association
which is not in fact a legitimate political party, such as the Communist
Party.212
2'NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958).

'id. at 461.
"Louisiana ex rel Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).

mGibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
0Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1961); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41

(1953).
210357 U.S. 449 (1958).

11id. at 459. See also Emerson, supra note 176, at 4-5.
2"Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 547 (1963).
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In making the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate political parties, the Court pointed out what it considers to be the distinguishing nature of the illegality involved:
It is argued that if Congress may constitutionally enact legislation
requiring the Communist Party to register, to list its members, to file

financial statements, and to identify its printing presses, Congress may
impose similar requirements upon any group which pursues unpopular
political ideology. Nothing which we decide here remotely carries such
an implication. The Subversive Activities Control Act applies only to
foreign-dominatedorganizations which work primarily to advance the
objectives of a world movement controlled by the government of a
foreign country. .

.

. It applies only to organizations directed, domi-

nated, or controlled by a particularforeign country ....

"

The distinction is reinforced by comparing the Court's protection
of a member of the Progressive Party in Sweezy 2t 4 with its unwillingness
in the same context to extend protection to a sometime affiliate of the
Communist Party in Uphaus. 15 Similarly, the Foreign Agents Registration Act was upheld but limited to those activities specifically under21
taken for a foreign principal. 1
The second exception involves organizations expressly committed
to the pursuit of their aims by unlawful means. The Communist Party's
alleged dedication to change through violent overthrow was even more
influential than the element of foreign control; the Court intended
chiefly to protect the government and the society not from a point of
political view but from an illegal mode of change-that which utilizes
secrecy and violence. It was this same disapproval of change by force
rather than through persuasion which underlay the Court's willingness
to sustain registration of the Ku Klux Klan. And, indeed, it was also
the characteristic of violence that permeated the rationale of Ex parte
Yarbrough,1 7 the case on which the Court chiefly relied in Burroughs
and Cannon, the leading case in government regulation of corrupt practices, and the only case to sustain disclosure requirements.
Stripped of its technical verbiage, the offense charged in the in21

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 104 (1961).

21354 U.S. 234 (1957).
215360 U.S. 72 (1959). See also Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free
Speech,
2 Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1100 (1961).
1'Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943); see Comment, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 215,
at 1092.
217110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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dictment is that the defendants conspired to intimidate Berry Saunders, a citizen of African descent, in the exercise of his right to vote
for a member of the Congress of the United States, and in the execution of that conspiracy they beat, bruised, wounded and otherwise
maltreated him; and in the second count that they did this on account
of his race, color and previous condition of servitude, by going in
disguise and assaulting him on the public highway and on his own
premises. . . .That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose
most numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the
people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a
proposition so startling to arrest attention and demand the gravest
consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is
superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect
the elections on which its existence depends from violence and
corruption.
If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great
natural and historical
enemies of all republics, open violence and
28
insidious corruption. 1

When the political association is not dedicated to violent means, the
21 9
privacy of its political activity has been generally protected.
The third major exception to political privacy involves the tactics
individuals use in attempting to influence elections or the political process. When there are willful attempts to defraud, deceive, or corrupt the
political process, the Court will not protect the privacy of the actors.
As we have already noted, "insidious corruption" was the companion
of "violence" in Ex parte Yarbrough.22 1 The fact that Burroughs and
Cannon22 ' relied principally on Yarbrough, coupled with the fact that
the first amendment issue was never raised in it, must vitiate somewhat
the force of its holding. "Corrupt practices" is a term of art which, until
Burroughs and Cannon, had a well-settled meaning connoting such offenses as bribery, graft, dishonesty, intimidation, purchase of office, and
intimidation of subordinates for political purposes. These are inherently
wrong and especially crude forms of a kind of corrupt practices that are
1"Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-58 (1884) (emphasis added).
t
'See Comment, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 215, at 1100.
-l110 U.S. 651 (1884).
-1290 U.S. 534 (1933).
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evil in themselves. While the reporting of contributions may be justified
as a means of protecting the public from the brazen kinds of corruption,
the making of contributions themselves is presumptively honest and
generally encouraged by public policy. Unlike the true "corrupt practices," contributing may or may not be wrong depending on the motive
of the giver, the motive that prompted the receiver, and post-election
official actions, if any, that were caused by them.
Closely related to such corrupt practices is the element of deception, which was the dominant force in the Court's decision in Harris"'
to sustain, but construe narrowly, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act. 12 Even Justice Douglas, in dissenting, conceded that the deception
factor would induce him to sustain a narrowly drawn act to achieve
disclosure:
I do not mean to intimate that Congress is without power to require
disclosure of the real principals behind those who come to Congress
(or get others to do so) and speak as though they represent the public
24
interest, when in fact they are undisclosed agents of special groups.
The same tendency to deceive and defraud is the reason for the
general favor which the anonymous political handbill bans have found
in the lower courts. The kind of evil at which they are aimed-the
prevention of non-attributed false charges and smears-is of a much
different order of magnitude and likelihood of occurring than that evil
which the disclosure of political constributions is designed to prevent.
Finally, it was also the deception theme which led the Court to
sustain the press disclosure requirement in Lewis Publishing.2 5 The
Court quoted as follows from the Senate Committee Report on the
point:
The extremely low postage rate accorded to second-class matter gives
these publications a circulation and a corresponding influence unequalled in history. It is a common belief that many periodicals are
secretly owned or controlled, and that in reading such papers the public
is deceived through ignorance of the interest the publication repre2
sents. 11
mSee text accompanying note 15 supra.
tm
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
221d. at 632 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 174-75 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2'Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
2'Id. at 312, quoting S. REP. No. 955.
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Absent the element of deception, therefore, whatever slight vitality there
is remaining in Lewis 272 should be of no weight in support of contribution disclosure generally.
If the distinction between the neutral nature of political contributions and the "grosser forms" of corruption is valid, and in view of the
tenuous nature of the constitutional authority for federal regulation of
the substantive dimensions of elections, the Court should be wary of
creating in compulsory disclosure of contributions a general exception
to the privacy it has afforded peaceful political activity.
So far as the privacy of first amendment rights is concerned, the
determining calculation is the extent to which disclosure of political
contributions constitutes a deterrent to free exercise. The first amendment exists not only to provide freedom from prior restraint by government, but also to prevent any deterrence caused by fear of subsequent
official or private retribution. 221 Justice Douglas has stated in Louisiana
v. NAACP that where "disclosure of membership lists results in reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is not required. ' ' 29
In most of the cases involving the NAACP, the threat to members and
contributors was more hostile and potentially more violent than any
consequence of political contribution disclosure would be. But that is
not the issue. The question is whether the anticipation of the consequences of contribution disclosure might reasonably deter citizens from
financially supporting the candidates of their choice, and there is some
evidence in support of an affirmative answer. 231
What is involved is not so much a fear of official reprisals, although
that is certainly a matter of real concern. It is the fear of harm to social,
business, employment, and professional relations from private kinds of
retribution; these are just as much a part of the deterrence that is to be
protected against as are official reprisals.231 In all cases, it is the governmental action forcing disclosure that is the source of the harm.232
22See text accompanying note 187 supra.

2"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP

v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). See also Comment, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 215, at 110405.
2,366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961). See also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 169 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2A. HEARD, supra note 4, at 360-62.

"'NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
23'The chilling effect of statutes banning anonymous advocacy or requiring affirma-

tive disclosure of views and affiliations arises not merely from the possibility that public
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The greatest threat is to contributors whose job may be lost or
whose advancement may be harmed by disclosure. Public employees
who wish to give to opposition candidates are particularly vulnerable,
as are middle and lower level employees of businesses and industries
whose employers are supporting other candidates. But disclosure works
also to deter giving by merchants and professionals who fear customer
or client disapproval.
The more intense the feelings on both sides, of course, the greater
the deterrence:
A particularly pernicious aspect of disclosure legislation is its selective
deterrence. On its face a disclosure law may be impartial, aimed at all
groups and viewpoints. This apparent impartiality may, however,
mask actual discrimination against unpopular ideas. The major
sources of deterrence are social and economic pressure; these are most
effective when they reflect, and are reinforced by, the majority sentiment of the community m
What is true for organizations seeking to change policy, such as the
NAACP, is equally true for organizations seeking to change governmental policymakers and officeholders. In politics, there are always
"ins" and "outs" in a natural state of opposition so that if all contributors are known to the public, the risk of reprisal is clearly present. That
risk is particularly high the more heated the contest or the greater the
disproportion of strength among the contestants. It obviously required
considerable courage for an Alabamian to contribute openly to VicePresident Humphrey in 1968 or for Northern supporters of Governor
Wallace to contribute openly to his primary campaigns in 1972. The
same deterrent operated throughout most areas of the Second District
of North Carolina to reduce contributions to Mayor Howard Lee's
congressional primary campaign in 1972,11 as it undoubtedly would in
campaigns of any other black challengers of long-entrenched Southern
incumbents. This forces challengers to rely on out-of-state financial
support, which, when publicized, becomes a political liability. Nor is
officials will misuse the information revealed. If the fear is principally of private reprisals

and community pressure-much of which is not actionable in tort-then there is no
damaging official action to be reviewed other than enforcement of the disclosure requirement itself.
Note, 83 HARV. L. REV., supra note 155, at 877-88.
mComment, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 215, at 1108; see Note, Disclosure as a Legislative
Device, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1273-74 (1963).
2mInterview with Howard Lee, Mayor of Chapel Hill, N.C., April 5, 1972.
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there any question about the extent of deterrence to opposition support
in one-party jurisdictions, such as to Republican candidates in many
parts of the South and to Democratic candidates in some parts of the
North. The result is that the greater the need for opposition, the greater
is the risk of associating for political purposes with challengers. The
greater the risk, the more deterrence there is to giving, and the greater
5
is the need for privacy?2
It is not only a question of economic reprisals. Disclosure exposes
public-spirited givers to public suspicion of their motives, raising a suspicion that they are attempting to buy influence or special favors. It
exposes them to harassment by reporters and to solicitation by businesses, philanthropies, and other candidates. Alexander Heard summed
up the consequences as follows:
The climate of politics in the United States exposes contributors to
harassment by the press and exploitation by the opposition. Even persons with no need or intent to evade the law are led to give under false
names. . . . Solicitors report that persons whom they approach for
contributions often say, in effect, "If you won't get my name in the
papers and have a lot of reporters calling me up in the middle of the
night, I will give you something." After being interviewed by a federal
investigator in 1956, the donor of a legitimate, publicly reported campaign gift declared he would give no more if doing so were going to
provoke investigations ....
Those who advocate full disclosure argue that any gift unable to
stand the light of day should not be made. Or, at least, persons making
it should pay the penalty of public reaction. However this may be, in
addition to the rascals, there are many citizens who feel that contributing is like voting, a personal matter and nobody else's business.?6
If contributing money to political campaigns is equivalent or ancillary to free political speech, then the aim of the Campaign Act to
disclose contributions is a direct assault on first amendment privacy,
rather than a mere incidental effect. Even if it is true that making a
political contribution is "speech plus," the deterrence caused by disclosure threatens to deprive a candidate, particularly a minority candidate,
of the financial support he needs in order to be able to speak out and
2This is one of the reasons given by the American Civil Liberties Union for vigorously

opposing the Justice Department's attempt to require it to register as a "political committee" under
the Act. It would have to reveal the names of its contributors and members, which would expose

them to reprisals. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 32, col. 7 (city ed.).
211A. HEARD, supra note 4, at 360-61.
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be heard. It is necessary, therefore, to conclude that there is a central
first amendment right of privacy of political speech and association at
stake. That conclusion, however, does not settle the issue, for it is necessary to consider the nature of the governmental interest being asserted
as justification for invading its exercise.
The Legitimacy and Weight of the Governmental Interest in Compelling Disclosure
The citizen's act of voting and the election campaign which is
designed to influence it are of central importance in a democracy. The
rules governing elections are the primary rules by which we live together
in society and by which the governed determine who their governors will
be and what policies they will pursue. Elections are democracy's primary means of resolving group competition and of apportioning the
costs and benefits of life in society among competing interests. They are
the basic mechanism whereby the citizens make value judgments-the
final and most .authoritative means for democratic choice-making. No
democratic process is more important or powerful, and, therefore no
point of influence is more attractive to those who would skew postelection policy to their private advantage. In addition, no aspect of
democracy is more vulnerable. Consequently, nothing with which Congress might concern itself domestically is of greater importance than
legislation enacted to ensure the fairness, honesty, and basic integrity
of elections.
The governmental interest in compelling disclosure of contributions
has three major aims. First, it seeks to guard against covert purchase
of policy favors by special interests and the use of political contributions
as a means of obtaining post-election preferential treatment in the distribution of personal and official favors. Secondly, it seeks to guard
against large donors' undue influence on policy, irrespective of any
intent to buy favors, since large political contributions will gain for their
donors, at the very least, preferential access to policymakers. Thirdly,
disclosure aims at informing the public of the nature of the interests that
are supporting particular candidates. Knowledge of who is supporting
whom and in what amounts is at least as pertinent to a citizen's capacity
to choose wisely as the candidates' public records, the speeches they
make, the proposals they advance, or the platform on which they run.
Indeed, financial support has the stuff of reality about it and can be
much more predictive of post-election official performance and policy
decisions than other kinds of information on which citizens are expected
to base their votes.
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One does not need to take the side of the social justifiers of free
speech 237 in order to assert that first amendment protection of speech
has a dual function: it serves not only to ensure that each individual is
free to speak out, but also to enhance the likelihood that the public can
hear all facets of everything that is pertinent to the decisions it must
make. The public's first amendment rights as hearers are just as important as their rights as speakers. 3 The disclosure of information about
political contributions serves those rights in that it increases substantially the scope and reliability of public knowledge about those competing to run the government. It gives the public and the press an indispensable fund of information to use in choosing among candidates and in
finding hidden motives which may be latent in official government decisions after the election. It would be a cynical and perverse misuse of the
greatest bulwark of freedom to employ the privacy of political speech
and association so as to frustrate the public's right to hear all that is
pertinent to its performance of the most sacred democratic rite.239
The legitimacy and weight of the governmental interest involved
here is no less crucial to government than the interest of governmental
self-preservation which moved the Court to sustain disclosure in the
Communist Party and subversive cases. 240 If the Court is willing to
override the privacy of political speech and association in order arguably to serve governmental self-preservation, unquestionably causing loss
of employment and exposure to public and private reprisals and obloquy, it must surely'be willing to do so in order to protect the integrity
of the bedrock act of democracy when the likelihood of real harm is not
as great and the extent of injury nowhere near as severe.
The nature of the governmental interest involved here is the same
as that which led the Court to sustain the Foreign Agents Registration
Act. As Justice Black said, dissenting in part because he and Justice
Douglas felt that the Court gave too narrow an interpretation to the
statute:
Resting on the fundamental constitutional principle that our people,
adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true
and the false, the bill is intended to label information of foreign origin
2"See Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 620 (1953).

"'Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
rnNutting, supra note 204, at 204.
20

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96 (1961).
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so that hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the
information comes from a disinterested source. Such legislation implements rather than 2detracts
from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the
41
First Amendment.
It is also essentially the same governmental interest which led the
Court to sustain the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act despite its
threat to privacy of speech and petition. Indeed, the Court made the
comparison explicit:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures
to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small
extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise
the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice
of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. This is the evil which the Lobbying Act was designed to help prevent.
Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely provided for a modicum of information from those
who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend
funds for that purpose. It wants only to know who is being hired, who
is putting up the money, and how much. It acted in the same spirit and
for a similar purpose in passing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act-to
maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process."'
Even Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson, dissenting because of the
vagueness of the statute's coverage, expressed the view that a properly
243
narrow statute to serve that end would be constitutional.
The public interest involved in most of the handbill and solicitation
cases-the prevention of littering or the protection of the public from
annoyance-was too weak to justify the infringement of the first amendment by overbroad delegations of power which gave officials too wide
a discretion to refuse the permits.2 14 The Talley25 decision is explained
by the fact that the public interest in the prevention of anonymous false
charges, fraud and libel, which might otherwise be weighty, was asserted
not as a justification for an otherwise valid ordinance but as a means
2'Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943).
22
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
2"Id. at 632 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting), 636 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2
'"Seetext accompanying notes 177-80 supra.
2
'Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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of saving an ordinance that was otherwise void on its face because of
clear overbreadth. If the issue is ever presented to the Court squarely
in a narrowly drawn statute explicitly dealing with political handbills,
the Court would probably put its opinion much as the district court did
in the Scott case:
The Congress determined that in certain specified instances the
writers of pamphlets must disclose their identity. And why was this
done? So that the electorate would be informed and make its own
appraisal of the reason or reasons why a particular candidate was
being supported or opposed by an individual or groups. Is there anything sinister in requiring disclosure of identity to the end that voters
may use their ballots intelligently?24
There are two keys to the Court's decision in the NAACP cases,
one of which-deterrence-we have already discussed. The other is the
fact that the governmental interest asserted in behalf of disclosure was
a sham interest, entirely lacking in substantiality. The Court's decisions,
therefore, were doubly easy-the absence of a legitimate public interest
to be served by disclosure and great harm to be caused to private interests by compelling it. While the factor of deterrence is likely to be
present in any cases involving contribution disclosure, the governmental
interest is quite substantial, too, making the competing interests much
more difficult to accomodate.
Finally, even if the first amendment was not raised in Burroughs
and Cannon, the Court's statement of the governmental interest at stake
in contribution disclosure remains persuasive:
The Congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity of
presidential and vice presidential elections.
. . . The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of his election and the vital character of its
relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole
people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without
power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election
from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to
the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. Congress,
undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses every other power
essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general
or destruction, whether threatened by
government from impairment
24 7
force or by corruption.
'United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D.N.D. 1961).

24290 U.S. at 545-48.
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Over twenty-five years later, in another context, the Court described
that interest as involving a situation "in which secrecy or the concealment of associations has been regarded as a threat to public safety and
to the effective, free functioning of our national institutions [and in
which Congress] has met the threat by requiring registration or disclo248
sure."
We have, therefore, a competiton between a preferred individual
right of free exercise and an equally preferred, weighty public interest,
which is itself related to the first amendment, in safeguarding the integrity of the central democratic choice process. This forces us inevitably
to consider the extent to which the means chosen by Congress are
narrowly drawn and no wider than necessary to achieve that end.
The Appropriateness of the CongressionalMeans
In examining the means adopted by Congress in the Campaign Act,
the Court will undoubtedly employ a closer standard of scrutiny than it
would were the individual rights involved not within the scope of first
amendment protection. As the Court stated recently, "It has become
axiomatic that 'precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area
so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' "249 In other words, the
Court will take great pains to see whether the means chosen have been
tailored to fit the ends precisely. The conclusion should be that they do
not. The disclosure requirements are not reasonably and specifically
related to their ends, nor are they the least drastic means available."'
The Act requires reporting and public disclosure of the name of
each contributor of in excess of one hundred dollars, his mailing address, occupation, and principal place of business, if any., As discussed
earlier, 25 2 however, the legitimate governmental interest is in disclosing
the names of those contributions in amounts sufficient to raise the possibility of post-election undue influence. This Act, therefore, casts a net
with much finer mesh than is required to catch those givers which it
might legitimately expose. Because great amounts of money are spent
2'1Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961).
24

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963), and citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1964), and
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).

2Comment, 83 HARv. L. REV., supra note 155, at 879.
"'Campaign Act § 304(b)(2), 86 Stat. 15.
2See text accompanying notes 237-39 supra.
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in even the smallest contested congressional election, it would take a
contribution several times the minimum amount in the Act to raise an
inference of undue influence.
The Act must also be found overbroad because the means chosen
constitute a direct invasion of the protected rights themselves. The real
danger of harm is to the little contributor. He is the one most likely to
be deterred by, and least able to defend himself against, whatever pressures may be brought against him by his employers, clients, customers,
business associates, and friends. The wealth which enables large contributors to afford large donations is likely to give them a sufficiently
strong position either to resist the deterrent pressures or to fight against
the reprisals if and when they actually occur. The big contributor can
take care of himself. The little contributor who cannot is likely either
to be deterred from giving or to suffer harm from doing so.
For both of these reasons-broader means than are justified by the
legitimate ends and the potential harm to those unnecessarily brought
within its reach-the disclosure provisions should be declared unconstitutional. Compelled disclosure should be limited to those contributions
in sufficiently large amounts as might reasonably be coercive or indebting to candidates.253
Whatever constitutional doubt is raised by the size of those contributions required to be reported could be erased by raising that amount
to a higher figure.254 The proper figure should be somewhere between
five hundred dollars, which was the amount set in 1949 by the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act, 55 and one thousand dollars. The higher
figure would seem to be more advisable, because costs of all kinds of
activities have risen considerably in the past twenty-four years and the
nature of a political contribution is inherently less likely to be colored
by a special immediate interest than are lobbying activities, which are
directed to a specific legislative end. A less acceptable alternative would
a'The court described the test as follows: "In a series of decisions, this Court has held that,
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more

narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose." See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268
(1967); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960).
2"See A. RoSNrrlAL, supra note 12, at 50: "In any event, a reasonably high floor on the
amount over which contributions would have to be reported would go far to overcome constitu-

tional objections."
-2 U.S.C. §§ 261-63 (1970).
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be to maintain the reporting threshold as it is, but to require public
disclosure of only those contributions over the amount of one thousand
dollars. The deterrent effect would still be present, because donors
would still fear leakage of their identity, but the likelihood of reprisal
would be considerably diminished.
In assessing the disclosure requirements, the Court would also be
likely to consider any of those characteristics which tend to lessen the
effectiveness of the Act. It would do so as a test of congressional bona
fides and to ascertain whether the means chosen were discriminatory in
any way.
As to the first point, the failure of Congress to provide for an
effective reporting and policing mechanism, such as a Federal Elections
Commission,216 must certainly be taken into account. In order for disclosure to be effective, there must be (1) quick and continuous reporting
before election day so that people can take the information into account
in casting their votes; (2) unimpeachable supervision beyond the influence of those being supervised so that people can have faith in the
accuracy of the reports; and (3) full information and the possibility of
obtaining any information omitted or questionable in the candidates'
reports. Congress chose instead to require only periodic reports", and
to leave supervisory authority in congressional hands,2 thereby making
the information published suspect of being manipulated by Congress.
Congress did not choose even to delegate supervisory power over
congressional elections to the Comptroller General, who was given such
authority over presidential elections 29 and who reports primarily to
Congress. Thus there is both a likelihood of the public's obtaining less
accurate and full information on congressional campaigns and a certainty of less strict and unbiased supervision in such campaigns.
Another omission of the Act also discriminates in favor of congressional candidates while at the same time frustrating full disclosure of
possible undue influence. By failing to prohibit the use of committees
supporting more than one candidate, such as the senatorial and congressional campaign committees, as shields to hide the connection between
those "earmarking" their contributions and specific congressmen for
whose campaigns the contributions are in fact to be used, Congress
2'See H.R. REP. No. 92-752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
2"Campaign Act § 304, 86 Stat. 14-16.
2"Campaign Act § 301(g), 86 Stat. 12.
259M.
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continues to enable many large special interests to exert their influence
on specific congressmen without the possibility of public knowledge and
scrutiny.
In sum, the congressional means are both broader than and frustrating to the legitimate ends of campaign disclosure. The larger the
amount of money given, the greater is its potential for shaping public
decisions to private ends. The larger the amount of money, the greater
is the extent to which the donor goes beyond mere speech and can be
said to waive his right to privacy. The larger the amount of money, the
greater is the capacity of the donor to protect himself from reprisals.
On the other hand, the smaller the contribution, the less is its
potential for undue influence. The smaller the contribution, the less
reasonable it is to regard it as a waiver of privacy. The smaller the
contribution, the greater is the need to shield the donor and the greater
is the risk of deterrence and of potential harm.
To the extent that a proper public policy on political giving can be
formulated, it must have as its goal the encouragement of larger numbers of small gifts and smaller numbers of large gifts. A constitutionally
valid means should have embodied that goal, but the Campaign Act
must be said not to have done so.
LIMITATIONS ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

The Right to Quantitatively Unlimited Freedoms of Speech and Press
The Case Precedentsfor the Right. We begin with the assumption
that the first amendment reserves to the speaker and writer sole discretion over the amount and content of his speech and writing. Because this
right to determine what one does or does not say, free from official
coercion, is the foundation for any subsidiary right to its private exercise, most of the cases discussed above"' must be viewed as lending
support to the existence of the primary right. To those decisions which
dealt with the invasion of first amendment privacy must now be added
another group of cases which deal more explicitly with government
attempts to limit, rather than restrain through exposure, the exercise of
first amendment rights.
It should be noted that only a very few of the cases considered deal
with governmental limitations on the amount of political activity, which
is the crux of our concern. They generally involve absolute bans either
20See text accompanying notes 161-236 supra.
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on certain kinds of political activity 8 ' or on political activity by certain
kinds of people. 82 To the extent that courts sustain absolute bans with
respect to some kinds of political activity, the inference must be that
they would also sustain limitations short of absolute bans of those activities. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because the courts
approve bans on specific kinds of political activity or political activity
by specific groups of people, they would sustain limitations on general
political activity of candidates or their supporters.
There are no cases dealing directly with general contribution limitations, but there are six separate lines of cases that are pertinent to any
consideration of contribution and expenditure limitations: (1) cases involving statutory prohibition of political contributions and expenditures
by labor unions; (2) cases involving statutory prohibition of political
contributions and expenditures by corporations; (3) cases involving statutory prohibition of political activity by public employees; (4) cases
involving statutory and administrative regulation of broadcasting programming; (5) cases involving regulation of or imposition of liability on
newspapers; and (6) cases involving statutory regulation of political
finances and proscription of corrupt practices in political campaigns.
Three labor cases have reached the Supreme Court, and in all of
them the Court avoided the issue of whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit labor unions from making contributions or expenditures in connection with political campaigns. 83 In United States v.
CIO2 the Court construed the statutory prohibition against union contributions as not including an editorial by President Philip Murray in
the official CIO newspaper endorsing and urging support for a particular congressional candidate, expressly doing so in order to avoid the
serious constitutional questions raised by the ban. In United States v.
UA W, the district court had dismissed an indictment charging the union
with using union funds to purchase broadcasting time for particular
congressional candidates. On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to face
the constitutional issues until the facts had been established by a trial." 5
21

An example of this is the ban on intimidation of voters.
2"An example of this is the ban on corporate, labor, or public employee political activity.
n'Such contributions are now prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
"2UnitedStates v. CIO, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). The district court had dismissed the indictment
on grounds that it was an unconstitutional violation of the first amendment. 77 F. Supp. 335
(D.D.C. 1948).

2"United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). On remand, the jury found the union not guilty.
See Lane, Analysis of the FederalLaw GoverningPoliticalExpenditures by Labor Unions, 9 LAB,
L.J. 725, 732 (1958).
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In both bases, the Court implied that the prohibition might involve
unconstitutional restraints on political speech.2 6 In Pipefitters Local

562 v. United States,6 7 the Court never mentioned the constitutional
issue, construing the statutory language and finding an error in the

judge's jury charge. There are three other Supreme Court cases 28 which
addressed the tangential question of whether unions might spend for

particular political purposes money raised by assessment over the objection of a member. The Court decided that unions can do so if they
refund to the objecting member the pro rata portion of his dues which
29
is attributable to the objectionable political activity.
In four lower court cases dealing with the labor political ban, 210 the

courts followed UnitedStates v. CIO in construing the alleged expenditure to be outside the statutory definition.2 1
Despite the sixty-five-year existence of the ban on corporate political contributions or expenditures, there is no Supreme Court case
construing

it.2

However, since the corporate ban is contained in the

"'United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 589 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121
(1948).
26792 S. Ct. 2247 (1972), modifying 434 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970).
2
'Railway Clerks Union v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963) (sustaining an employee objection and
setting out permissible remedies); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 746 (1961)
(sustaining an employee's objection to certain specific political expenditures); Railway Employees'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (sustaining the constitutionality of the provision of the
Federal Railway Labor Act permitting union shop agreements, over objection that unions engage
in political activity and therefore compulsory membership violates an individual member's first
amendment rights).
26
'In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 747-48 (1961), the Court
distinguished Hanson by pointing out that the record there contained no evidence of any actual
political activity on the part of the union.
20United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 1961); United States v. Warehouse Workers
Local 688, 29 U.S.L.W. 2202 (E.D. Mo. 1960); United States v. Construction Laborers Local 264,
101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
In the Painterscase, payments were for radio and newspaper advertising opposing candidates
for President and Congress, while in Construction Laborers three union employees who devoted
considerable time to political activity were regarded as not being either "contributions" or "expenditures." In the Anchorage case the television broadcasts were held to have b-.en paid out of
voluntary funds, although the court did go on to say the Act was constitutional. In Warehouse
Workers the fund involved was also held to be voluntary.
See also Rauh, Legality of Union PoliticalExpenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 152 (1961); Note,
Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act; Validity of Restrictions on Union PoliticalActivity, 57 YALE L.J.
806 (1948).
-1434 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1970).
12See Haley, Limitations on PoliticalActivities of Corporations,9 VILL. L. REv. 593 (1964);
King, Corporate PoliticalSpending and the First Amendment, 23 U. PITT. L. REv. 847 (1962);
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same section of the criminal code as the labor ban," 3 the Supreme
Court cases involving the latter necessarily touched on the corporate
ban. There are several lower court decisions which do deal explicitly
with the corporate ban. In United States v. United States Brewers'
Association,"4 a case which arose nine years after the original provision
was enacted, the district court declared the statute constitutional against
first amendment attack, but cited no precedents, gave no reasons, and
indeed, stated in a tone of surprise that "so far as we are aware, it has
never been claimed that this general restriction upon political contributions was an infringement of the freedom of speech or of the press."2 5
In UnitedStates v. Lewis Food Company,276 the Ninth Circuit, without
reaching the first amendment issue, reversed a district court dismissal",
of an indictment on the ground that the alleged acts were not within the
scope of the statute's prohibitionY8 In a very recent case, United States
v. First National Bank of Cincinnati,219 however, the district court declared that the provision violated the first amendment on the ground
that it deprived creditworthy borrowers of their freedom of association
and violated the fifth amendment on the ground that it constituted a
taking of the bank's right to make bona fide loans without any compelling justification. No question of its first amendment right was presented
because the bank had not itself made a contribution to a political campaign.2 °
Four cases involving the prohibition of varying kinds of political
Lambert, Corporate PoliticalSpending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033 (1965);
Comment, Control of Corporateand Union PoliticalExpenditures:A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 27
FORDHAM L. REV. 599 (1959); Note, Corporate PoliticalAffairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821
(1961).
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).

21239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916) (overruling demurrers and requiring defendants to plead to the
indictments for conspiring to make money contributions in a congressional election).
275
d. at 169.
27366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966).
2n236 F. Supp. 849 (S.D. Cal. 1964).

"'The defendant had placed an advertisement listing the names of congressmen and senators,
along with a rating for each on the basis of their "free enterprise," "constitutional government"
and "freedom under God" voting records.
11'329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971).

'WAs already noted at note 41 supra, the Campaign Act includes an exception to its ban on
corporate political contributions for bona fide bank loans. See also Egan v. United States, 137
F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943), sustaining § 12(h) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 791(h) (1970), which banned political contributions,
although not expenditures.
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activity by public employees have reached the Supreme Court, 21 but in
only two of them has the first amendment issue been discussed in the
Court's decision.21 2 In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,2s3 the Court

sustained the constitutionality of a general ban on the ground that the
congressional judgment of a need for political neutrality should be given

deference by the Court even if it "trenches to some extent upon unfettered political action." 4 Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,"5 decided the same day, also sustained the constitutionality of a related ban
on political activity by federally-financed state officials, but simply relied on Mitchell without any further discussion of the constitutional

question. For the next twenty years, the holdings in these two cases were
regarded in lower court decisions as dis.positive of the question of the
first amendment constitutionality of the bans.2 8 Recently, however,
2'Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (sustaining the removal of a member
of the Oklahoma State Highway Commission who was serving also as Chairman of the Democratic
State Central Committee); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (sustaining a
discharge of a roller in the United States Mint for serving as a ward executive committeeman and
taking part in election day campaigning); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930) (sustaining a conviction of a Congressman for receiving from other federal employees political contributions to be used in his own campaign); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (denying a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus from a federal employee convicted of receiving political contributions
from other federal employees). See generally Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions upon Public
Employment: New Departures in the Protection of FirstAmendment Rights, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
129 (1969); Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal,60 YALE L.J. 986 (1951); Rose, A Critical
Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 510 (1962); Note, The Hatch Act-A Constitutional
Restraint of Freedom?, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 345 (1969); Note, PoliticalActivity and the Public
Employee: A Sufficient Causefor Dismissal, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 736 (1970).
2
aIn Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 376 (1882), there was a strong dissent by Mr. Justice
Bradley on first amendment grounds, but the Court never discussed those issues in its opinion.
- 3 30 U.S. 75, 94 (1947), construing 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1970), which prohibits officers and
employees of the executive branch from taking "an active part in political management or in
political campaigns," defined as "those acts of political management or political campaigning
which were prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by
determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President."
21330 U.S. at 102.
- 3 3 0 U.S. 127 (1947), construing 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1970), which prohibits state or local
officers and employees from taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns," defined in 5 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(5) (1970) as in note 283 supra.
2"Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.
1971) (sustaining the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1970), as applied to the director
of a regional park authority who ran for the state legislature); Kearney v. Macy, 409 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970); Englehardt v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 304 F.2d
882 (5th Cir. 1962), affg 197 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (sustaining the Commission's finding
of a violation of the Hatch Act by the Alabama State Highway Director who served also as
Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee); Palmer v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d
450 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962); Fishkin v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp.
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lower courts have begun questioning the continued vitality of the
Mitchell and Oklahoma decisions2 7 and in some cases have gone so far
as to declare them no longer to be good law. 88
The power of Congress to regulate the content of broadcasting,

primarily through delegation to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), has been sustained by the Court against first amendment
attack. 289 To protect stations from the consequences of their decreasing
control over aspects of public affairs broadcasting, the Court has extended to broadcasting, 290 and broadened somewhat, 291 the immunity
40 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appealdismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n v.
Wisconsin Natural Resources Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (sustaining state agency
policy prohibiting employees from running for any partisan elective office, as applied to a poultryman on the state game farm). It should be noted that while these cases all deal with different
sections of the Hatch Act, the principle involved is the same-to ensure the political neutrality of
public employees, and to protect employees from political intimidation by their superiors and
colleagues.
'"Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971) (invalidating a Macon, Georgia, ordinance prohibiting contributions of money and support to political candidates for any office, as well
as public identification with them, by city officers and employees, as applied to firemen who put
bumper stickers on cars supporting a candidate for the state legislature, on grounds of overbreadth
and vagueness); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578
(D.D.C. 1972) (explicitly invalidating Mitchell, on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness arising
out of the breadth of the § 7324(a)(2) definition as "those acts of political management or political
campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July
19, 1940, by determination of the Civil Service Commission under rules prescribed by the President"; the court pointed out that there were some 3,000 rulings included in that incorporation by
reference);* Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972) (invalidating a Cranston, R.I.,
ordinance banning any political candidacy by public employees, as applied to a city policeman, on
grounds of overbreadth and vagueness); cf Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ohio
197 1) (invalidating a Toledo, Ohio, ordinance banning any political candidacy by public employees,
as applied to a city policeman, on grounds of overbreadth because the ordinance was not confined
to "partisan" political activity, which the court held it might legally proscribe).
2uSee, e.g., Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 472 (5th Cir. 1971); Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F.
Supp. 574, 581 (D.R.I. 1972).
2'Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (sustaining the "fairness doctrine,"
and an FCC order to a station compelling it to allow a person attacked on a broadcast to have a
chance to respond); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (sustaining a variety of FCC
regulations dealing with relationships between networks and affiliates, based on public interest
criteria); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) (sustaining the public interest
criteria by which the FCC evaluates licensing and renewal applications). See also Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (sustaining a state law requiring approval of the
Board for all broadcast advertising by optometrists; no first amendment question was raised in
the state court proceedings, and the Supreme Court refused to permit any to be raised on appeal).
n'Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
"'Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), extending to a broadcaster, who
reported an account of an arrest using unflattering descriptions of the plaintiff, immunity from a
libel suit. There were five separate opinions-three concurring and two dissenting-and no major-
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from libel suits which it bestowed on newspapers in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.29 2 The FCC, as the respository of congressional power

over broadcasting, has rendered a number of opinions dealing with the
scope of a station's compulsory responsibility under the fairness doc-

trine,293 and several recent circuit court of appeals decisions have sustained the FCC's application of the fairness doctrine to a variety of
941

issues.
The immunity of newspapers from government regulation and, increasingly, from libel suits arising out of public affairs comment and
reporting has been firmly established by the Supreme Court in a line of
important decisions. 2 s With the exception of the early disclosure case
ity on the grounds for decision. Three justices (Brennan, the Chief Justice, and Blackmun) applied
the New York Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity, and believed it covered an action by
a private individual in an event of public or general interest. Mr. Justice Black re-asserted his New
York Times view that libelous statements by news media are privileged even if made knowingly.
Mr. Justice White expressed the view that broadcasters are privileged in reporting and commenting
on official actions of public officials with respect to private persons.
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" 3E.g., Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970) (holding that the obligation to broadcast
the other side without paid sponsorship does not extend to political campaigns); Television Station
WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967) (requiring the broadcaster to carry anti-smoking advertisements
as the other side of the public controversy over smoking, in response to the vast paid advertising
for cigarettes, on request even if no paid sponsor can be found); Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40
F.C.C. 576 (1963) (requiring stations which broadcast one side of a public question on a paid
broadcast to broadcast the other side, if requested, even if a paying sponsor cannot be found). See
generally Barrow, The Equal Opportunitiesand Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting:Pillarsin the
Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447 (1968); Kalven, Broadcasting,Public Policy and
the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & EcON. 15 (1967).
"'Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (noting that the "fairness doctrine" is not to
be confused with the doctrine of "equal time," and holding that a station's reasonable treatment
of an issue does not require it to allow a particular anti-war protest group to respond to spot
advertisements in behalf of army recruiting); National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d
194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970) (sustaining FCC ordei and rules establishing subscription television, even though the rules prohibited STV from carrying certain kinds of
programs); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (sustaining FCC order requiring
stations which carry cigarette advertising to devote a significant amount of broadcast time to
presenting the case against cigarette smoking); cf. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace
v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted,92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (No. 71-864) (holding
unconstitutional under the first amendment an FCC rule permitting stations to refuse to sell any
advertising time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial public issues; this
decision considerably expands the "fairness doctrine"); Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC,
436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (requiring FCC to consider whether radio station had violated
"fairness doctrine" by refusing to broadcast commercials for striking union, while continuing to
broadcast commercials for employer). See also United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing an FCC order denying a public interest group intervention in a renewal
proceeding).
"'Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (reversing a libel judgment arising out
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of Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan discussed above, and similarly discredited cases withholding the use of the mails from politically unpopular newspapers, 1 there appears to be no federal case sustaining direct
government regulation of newspapers." 7
Finally, in addition to the corrupt practices cases cited and discussed above,29 there are several state court decisions sustaining statu-

tory requirements prohibiting candidates from spending more than the
statutory maximum in campaigns2 9 and compelling candidates to appoint campaign treasurers"'0 and to channel all contributions and expenditures through such treasurers.3 1 On the other hand, there are
cases invalidating, on grounds of freedom of speech and press, statutes
of a false newspaper story that the plaintiff, the Mayor, and a candidate for county tax assessor,
had been charged with perjury in a federal court); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971)
(reversing a libel judgment arising out of a published column to the effect that plaintiff, a candidate
for United States Senator, was a "former small-time bootlegger," on grounds that a charge of
criminal conduct is always relevant to a candidate's fitness for office, again relying on New York
Times); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating a state statute forbidding editorial
comment on political races on election day, on grounds of freedom of the press); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reversing a libel judgment on freedom of the press grounds,
holding that publications are immune from libel actions arising out of comment or reporting on
public officials, even if in a paid advertisement, and even if untrue, unless printed with actual
knowledge of their untruth); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (invalidating a
statute which taxed newspapers according to the volume of advertising); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating a Minnesota statute which permitted the abatement, as a public
nuisance, of "a 'malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical,'" id. at 701-02, as a violation of freedom of the press).
-8229 U.S. 288 (1913).
2"See Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971) (implying
that even a monopoly newspaper has an absolute right to accept, reject or revise advertising copy,
and that it is not subject to any "fairness doctrine"); Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that a newspaper has an absolute right to refuse editorial
advertisements from unions protesting imported clothing even if, interalia, the paper carried retail
store advertising for such clothing). But see Zucker v. Panitz, 229 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(holding that a public school newspaper was a part of the curriculum and, therefore, could be
required to accept a paid advertisement opposing the war); Chronicle & Gazette Publishing Co. v.
Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690 (1947)
(upholding a New Hampshire law forbidding newspapers and broadcasting from charging higher
rates for political advertising than for commercial advertising); City of Baltimore v. A.S. Abell
Co., 218 Md. 273, 145 A.2d 111 (1958) (invalidating Baltimore tax on newspaper and radio
advertising); City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. App. 2d 382, 252 P.2d 56,
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 833 (1953); Ulman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225 (1919) (sustaining
a right of access to newspapers, apparently the only U.S. case doing so); Barron, Access to the
Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
28See notes 197-202 supra and accompanying text.
29State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895 (1930).
mSecretary of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70, 222 A.2d 693 (1966).
"'Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953).
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prohibiting anyone other than a candidate from spending money for
political purposes outside his home county"" and generally manifesting
a reluctance to construe the candidate-accountability provisions
strictly. 3 3
Extending the Right to Protection Against Limitations on Campaign Contributions and Expenditures. We have noted that the Court,

in supporting its assertion that first amendment freedoms are not unlimited, divides speech into protected and unprotected categories." 4 It is

exceedingly unlikely that the Court would create a new category of
unprotected speech, particularly for political speech and association,
since it has been continually shrinking the vitality of the pre-existing
categories of obscenity, 35 libel, 3°8 "fighting words,' 3 7 and "speech
plus."3 8 With the possible exception of the last, those categories would
"'State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 158 N.W. 696 (1916).
3"Ervin v. Capitol Weekly Post, 97 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1957) (construing the candidateaccountability provision not to include expenditures for newspaper ads in behalf of a candidate
before his formal announcement); Veal v. Thompson, 287 Ky. 742, 155 S.W.2d 214 (1941) (sustaining a judgment refusing to impute to a candidate knowledge of and intent to commit violations of
the corrupt practices laws by his supporters); Daniel v. Gregg, 97 N.H. 452, 91 A.2d 461 (1952)
(holding that omissions from candidate's financial reports required to be filed were either without
his sanction and knowledge or insufficiently serious to disqualify him from running).
""See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961).
3E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). But see Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
"'E.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (extending immunity to columnist from libel
action brought by county recreation area supervisor); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
(extending immunity to district attorney from libel action brought by criminal court judges whom
he criticized); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (extending immunity to
newspaper from libel action brought by a city commissioner libeled in a paid advertisement). But
see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel). See also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971), discussed supra note
295.
znTerminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (invalidating Chicago ordinance on breach of
the peace as defined by a trial court judge to include speech which "invites dispute"). But see Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (affirming conviction for disorderly conduct involving a street
corner speech which stirred the crowd to angry muttering and pushing); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (sustaining a statute forbidding "'any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person . . . lawfully in any . . . public place,'" id. at 569. as interpreted to
mean words causing a breach of the peace by the addressee).
'eamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (sustaining an injunction against labor
picketing to induce an employer to urge employees to join the union, which the appellate court
found to be against state public policy); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (sustaining
an injunction against picketing aimed at persuading a business to hire employees on a racial quota
equivalent to the racial proportions of its customers, which state courts had found was contrary to
California public policy); Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (sustaining an
injunction against labor picketing of a business, operated by the owners without employees, in
order to obtain a union shop agreement); Building Serv. Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339
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indeed be strange bedfellows for an activity that the Court has called
"the essence of self-government."309 And to argue that the presence of
money converts political speech into political "speech plus" would be
inconsistent with the characteristics of the body of "speech plus" cases
and would deny protection entirely to most forms of political campaigning. Justice Douglas commented on this point in his dissent in the UA W
case:
The making of a political speech up to now has always been one of
the preferred rights protected by the First Amendment. It usually costs
money to communicate an idea to a large audience. But no one would
seriously contend that the expenditure of money to print a newspaper
deprives the publisher of freedom of the press. Nor can the fact that it
costs money to make a speech-whether it be hiring a hall or purchasing time on the air-makes the speech any the less an exercise of First
Amendment rights.310

There are also cases which sustain prohibitions on speech in certain
places" and speech by means of sound amplification devices, 312 as well

as the handbill and solicitation licensing cases discussed above.1 3 At
most, these holdings permit some reasonable burdens on the manner,
mode, time, or location of speech. They do not support the proposition
that either the content or the amount of speech itself can be regulated
U.S. 532 (1950) (sustaining an injunction against labor picketing of a small hotel to get the owner
to sign a contract with union as bargaining agent after employees had previously decided against
unionization, on grounds that it was contrary to state statute for an employer to coerce employees
in the choice of a bargaining agent); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)
(sustaining an injunction against union picketers who were attempting to induce a wholesaler to
stop selling to non-union peddlers, which state courts had found to be a conspiracy in restraint of
trade).
"Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
"'United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 594 (1957).
3
""'The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still
do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public
place and at any time." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); see Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968) (prohibiting picketing at courthouse); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
(prohibiting demonstrations at jails); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding a statute
against picketing near courthouse). But see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (permitting
sit-in in public library); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (permitting silent picketing at state capitol). See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 1.
32
" Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sustaining an ordinance prohibiting sound trucks
on city streets or in public places). But see Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (invalidating
an ordinance banning sound amplification devices except "'[p]ublic dissemination . . . of items
of news
and matters of public concern,'" id. at 559 n.l, as permitted by the chief of police).
313
See text accompanying notes 177-82 supra.
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by government. Indeed, the hesitancy with which the Court permitted
even these incidental restrictions on speech suggests how loath it would
be to limit expression directly in quantity or in content.
As we have seen, the validity of the labor and corporate political
contribution bans has never been determined by the Court; 314 it has
noted the presence of serious constitutional questions raised by the bans,
but has managed to avoid addressing them. 315 The Court may no longer
have the chance to address the constitutionality of the labor-corporate
bans, because the Campaign Act legitimates "voluntary" labor and
corporate funds for partisan political activity. 316 This leaves only the
question of whether involuntary funds may be spent for such purposes;
so far as unions are concerned, it has already been answered in the
affirmative, subject to the rebate requirement. 317 The ban on the partisan political use of corporate funds themselves still exists, however, and
would likely be sustained. Non-partisan political expenditures from corporate or exacted union funds (such as for voter registration and getout-the-vote campaigns) and partisan communications addressed to corporate shareholders, union members,
and their families are expressly
318
Act.
Campaign
the
by
allowed
Had the Court been willing to confront the absolute labor contribution and expenditure ban, it would probably have found it unconstitutional; five Justices have stated their belief that it was,319 and eight more
have professed concern about it.1' ° Most likely it would have sustained
a limitation on the amount rather than an absolute ban. 32 ' However,
even if the Court had sustained the labor-corporate ban, a limitation on
the amount contributed or spent by a candidate could not be sustained
on the same reasoning. Congressional power over individuals is in no
way nearly as wide as it is over corporations, labor unions, and other
associations of individuals. Moreover, the rationale of 'the laborcorporate ban was to prevent aggregations of organizational wealth
"'See notes 263-80 and accompanying text supra.
"'United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948).

"'Campaign Act § 205, 86 Stat. 10, amending 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
"'International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769 (1961).
"'Campaign Act § 205, 86 Stat. 10, amending 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
"'Four justices in United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948)-Rutledge, Black, Doug-

las, and Murphy-and Warren in United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957).
"'These eight were the other members of the Court in both cases. See Lane, supra note 265,

at 736.
"'United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 598 n.2 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 146 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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from being used in an election so as to exert undue influence on a
candidate become officeholder. The crucial element of undue influence
is entirely lacking when it is the candidate himself whose contributions
or expenditures Congress is attempting to limit. The labor-corporate
ban cases are, therefore, no authority for the constitutionality of an
expenditure or contribution limit on candidates themselves.
The public employee cases present a slightly different situation in
that Congress arguably had the power to attach to public employment
conditions which reasonably limited an employee's political activity.
The nexus for the power over the person being controlled was the fact
of public employment and not the nature of the act being regulated. In
any event, the characterization of public employment as a privilege to
which conditions may be attached, rather than a right, has been gener323
ally discredited in a series of cases, 322 and a number of lower courts
have recognized its demise by refusing to follow the holding in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell,324 which was based on the distinction.

Professor Emerson, perhaps the nation's leading first amendment
assumption that United Public
scholar, has declared that "[i]t is a safe
'325
Workers retains little vitality today.
The same reasoning would seem to suggest that Ex parteCurtis,321
which sustained the conviction of a federal employee for receiving funds
for political purposes from other federal employees, 327 would be decided differently today. The evil to which the bans on giving political
money to other governmental employees 328 and on soliciting or accepting such money 29 are addressed is the use of one's dominant position
m"It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 ( 1963); accord, Van Alstyne, supra note 186. See also Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 ( 1970); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
323See note 287 supra.
-4330 U.S. 75 (1947).
32T. EMERSON, supra note 87, at 587. See also Bruff, supra note 281, at 157: "It is extremely

doubtful that the provision upheld in Mitchell would be held constitutional today since it squarely
controverts the New York Times policy of freeing political debate. At any rate, the statutory

provision Mitchell upheld surely fails to meet the standard ofShelton [Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960)] and Robel [United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)]."
26106 U.S. 371 (1882).
32This is still a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
=18 U.S.C. § 607 (1970).
m18 U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
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over subordinate employees to obtain funds for political purposes. To
the extent that the prohibition remains wider than that, it is very likely
to be held violative of the first amendment rights of public employees. 33 1 In the absence of actual or potential intimidation, as was present in United States v. Wurzbach, 331 such a broad infringement of
political speech and association could not be sustained under the Court's
current "less drastic means" test.312 The Court's generous deference
to congressional judgment in Curtis ninety years ago 333 and in
Mitchell twenty-five years ago 334 has long since been displaced by
stringent scrutiny in first amendment cases. 35 If it were called on to
decide Curtis today, the Court would probably speak in much the same
language Mr. Justice Bradley used in dissenting in that same case:
I do not believe that Congress has any right to impose such a condition
upon any citizen of the United States. The offices of the government
do not belong to the Legislative Department to dispose of on any
conditions it may choose to impose. .

.

. They belong to the United

States, and not to Congress; and every citizen having the proper qualifications has the right to accept office, and to be a candidate therefor.
This is a fundamental right of which the legislature cannot deprive the
citizen, nor clog its exercise with conditions that are repugnant to his
other fundamental rights. . . . It prevents the citizen from cooperating with other citizens of his own choice in the promotion of his
political views. To take an interest in public affairs, and to further and
promote those principles which are believed to be vital or important
30As currently written, these provisions do not make it illegal for a public employee to make
political contributions to challengers-those who are seeking office, but not yet elected. It would
seem exceedingly difficult to justify that distinction.
-1200 U.S. 396 (1929).
2
33 See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra.
rThe evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has been to
promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain
proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope of
legislative power, and it is not easy to see why the act now under consideration does
not come fairly within the legitimate means to such an end.

106 U.S. at 373.
""'The determination of the extent to which political activities of governmental employees
shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress. Courts will interfere only when such regulation
passes beyond the generally existing conception of governmental power." 330 U.S. at 102.
rIn a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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public
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views
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promote
and
propagate
It also seems clear that newspapers and magazines are protected
by the first amendment from any governmental effort to limit the
amount of advertising space that can be legally bought by a candidate
or his supporters. The Campaign Act prohibits newspapers and magazines from selling space to a candidate for federal office without a
written certification that the value of the space purchased will not exceed the dollar limitations imposed by the Act. 331 Violation of this
provision subjects a person to a five thousand dollar fine or five years
imprisonment. 38 Leaving aside for a moment the question of whether
the candidate's rights are broad enough to protect him from being prosecuted for buying space in excess of his limit, 339 it would seem unlikely
that Congress could prohibit newspapers and magazines from selling
any space to the candidate or his supporters. Under the holdings in
Near, Grosjean, and Mills,34 to the extent that the provision prevents
the press from selling space in excess of the dollar limit or without the
required candidate's authorization, it is an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the press. To the extent that it requires the press to
obtain a written certification before selling space within the allowed
amount, it is also unconstitutional, because the burden it places on the
press is a prior restraint to selling advertisements. One can also assume
that the limitation of the rates charged by newspapers and magazines
for political advertising to those charged "for comparable use of such
space for other purposes ' 3' would be invalid for the same reasons.
There is only one state case sustaining newspaper rate-setting for political campaigns, and the Supreme Court declined to review it.341 It is
hard to see how congressional establishment of newspaper advertising
rates could be reconciled with the immunity of the press from govern343
mental regulation of any kind.
3u106 U.S. at 376-77.
nCampaign Act § 104(b), 86 Stat. 6.

mCampaign Act § 106, 86 Stat. 8.

3'Campaign Act § 104 (a)(2), 86 Stat. 6.
See note 295 supra.

34

u'Campaign Act § 103(b), 86 Stat. 4.
3"Chronicle & Gazette Publishing Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 (1946),
appealdismissed, 329 U.S. 690 (1947).

3See Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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It is easier to find precedents for limiting the amount of broadcast
time a candidate can buy and a station can sell* 44 Courts have been
345
willing to sustain governmental intervention in the broadcast media,
such as licensing and the imposition of a "fairness doctrine" in programming, although similar intervention has been struck down when
attempted in the print media.3 46 While broadcast regulations were originally made and sustained on the basis of the need to allocate a limited
number of frequencies, governmental power over broadcasting has been
repeatedly held to be more extensive than that required to regulate
technological matters alone 34 -wide enough to ensure that broadcasters' substantive programming serves primarily the public's first amendment right to hear and see multi-sided treatment of public issues. That
power is premised on the broadcasters' trusteeship of the airwaves for
the public benefit.348 The courts, therefore, have subordinated broadcasters' first amendment rights to the "right of the viewers and listeners
'
. . .which is paramount."349
All of these cases, however, sustain the government's power to
compel broadcasters to expand their programming. With one general
exception there are no cases involving attempts to restraina broadcaster
from selling time or from devoting more than a specified amount of time
to a particular area of coverage. There would seem to be a considerable
difference between the government's power to add to programming and
the power implied in the political advertising limitations to diminish
programming. The former has been sustained to promote fairness of
treatment and to increase the scope and richness of public discourse on
public questions. By providing a forum for those who might not otherwise be able to speak out, the governmental power to augment programming serves the public's freedom to speak as well as its freedom to hear.
Public rights are elevated over the rights of broadcasters when they act
to narrow discussion and to restrain speech. It does not follow, however,
that the Court would be willing to subordinate the freedom of a broadcaster to limitations that are at best only arguably in the public interest
and at worst patent restrictions on the amount of political speech. This
3

1"A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 40.

31

See cases cited notes 288-95 supra.
"'See Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Chicago

Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970).

" TNBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
4
3'
See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 651-55 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. granted,92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (No. 71-864).
"'Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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interpretation of the nature of FCC power over broadcasting is consistent with the congressional denial to the FCC of "the power of censorship over. . . communications and signals" and with the Congressional
prohibition against interfering "with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication.""3 ' In order to sustain the broadcasting expenditure limitations, the Court would have to construe those limitations, which are inherently constricting, as expanding the public's right
to hear and see.35' This would be reminiscent of Orwellian "doublethink" and would infringe both the candidates' right to unrestricted free
speech and the broadcasters' right to freedom from negative governmental restraint.
The only governmental control of the subject matter of speech
which courts have sustained is that regulating the advertising of products that may be injurious to health or that policing unfair or deceptive
advertising practices. The most recent example is the ban on cigarette
advertising enacted by Congress in 1969352 and held constitutional by
a lower court early in 1972.111 That category can be easily distinguished from political broadcasting because it is motivated entirely by
a profit-seeking interest, involves a clear danger either to public health
or of public deception, and embraces subject matter that is far afield
from the protected area of political discussion.
In the realm of public affairs, then, the rule in broadcasting is fairly
clear. In order to promote wider and freer discussion of public issues,
the Court will compel broadcasters to give access to unrepresented views
on public questions,3 4 will prevent broadcasters from banning advertisements about controversial public matters,355 and will protect broadcasters from libel suits growing out of coverage of public matters or of
public officials' actions.3 6 While the courts, therefore, are perhaps willing to sustain legislation that creates a floor on public affairs program-47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).

"'For such an argument see Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure
Ceilings, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 214, 228-29 (1972).
32
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1970).
(1972).
F. Supp. mNational Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 351See cases cited note 293 supra.
3Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
granted,92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (No. 71-864).
"Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (reversing libel judgment arising out
of derogatory reference in connection with a news report about plaintiff's arrest); Farmers Education & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (reversing libel
judgment arising out of broadcast carried by a station under the equal-time provision of § 315).
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ming in broadcasting, they should be less willing to sustain a ceiling. 57
Although Congress thus could not put a limit on political broadcasting,
Congress can impose maximum political advertising rates in broadcasting, even though it has never asserted general ratesetting power over
licensees. It could be argued, as it was in NationalAssociation of Theatre Owners v. FCC,35 that there is an important distinction between

utility-like common carriers, whose rates Congress has permitted the
FCC to regulate, 39 and "broadcasting" stations, whose rates Congress

has not submitted to FCC supervision. The fact that Congress did not
assume and delegate that power does not mean that it believed broadcast rate-setting to be outside its authority. On the contrary, when the

equal-time provision was enacted in 1952, Congress provided that time
charges could not exceed the rates for comparable uses for other pur-

poses, 360 and there is no reason to think that the plenary power to set
rates for broadcasting is any less than the comparable congressional

power to set rates for common communication carriers. The rationalization of political broadcasting rate-setting could be found in the effect

that lower rates have in increasing the amount of time that political
candidates could purchase, thereby coming squarely within the rule of
36 '
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.
While there are many cases sustaining congressional power to regulate federal elections, 36 2 not one of them has sustained limitations on
-'"There appears to be only one case that presents a troubling exception to this generalization.
In the recent District of Columbia Circuit decision, National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC,
420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970), the court sustained an F.C.C.
rule regulating "pay-television" experiments, which prohibited subscription television stations from
broadcasting any advertising, feature films released within two years of proposed broadcast, sporting events broadcast live on commercial television within two years of proposed broadcast, and
serials. That case appears to be distingdishable because of the infant and precarious nature of paytelevision experiments, as well as the desire of the FCC to protect the economic viability of
commercial television. Despite the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, the case does not seem
determinative of the issue. The court's reliance on both Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), and Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), both of which coerced
positive actions by the stations, seems misplaced. Furthermore, the court's argument that the
restrictions could be justified because pay-television would give the public "more rather than less
diversity of expression in its television programming," 420 F.2d at 208, goes rather to the justification for pay-television than to a rationale for sustaining program restrictions.
-420 F.2d 194, 202-03 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
-947 U.S.C. § 201, 203 (1970).
36047 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
38'395 U.S. 367 (1969).
"'United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Burroughs and Cannon v. United States,
290 U.S. 534 (1934); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S.
232 (1921); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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the amount and content of political speech. Court-sustained congressional regulations of elections has taken either a neutral, supervisory
form (such as establishing dates, fixing methods of conducting or policing elections, and disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures) or the form of laws proscribing gross kinds of corruption.
Newberry v. United States13 dealt with a violation of the expenditure
limitations in a senatorial primary, but the case turned on congressional
power to regulate corrupt practices in primaries, which the majority
held Congress did not have. Three justices concurred for reasons of
error in the jury charge and obviously believed the expenditure limit was
constitutional, although they did not discuss it substantively or consider
any first amendment conflict with it. While several opinions have included dicta asserting congressional power to supervise the use of money
in federal elections, such as Yarbrough's reference to "the free use of
money in elections," 34 and Burroughs and Cannon's reference to "the
improper use of money, ' 365 the context in which such assertions were
made suggests that the Court had in mind the character of the particular
use of money rather than the amount of money spent. Those cases
and others"'6 held that Congress has the power to prevent bribery,
purchase of office, and gross corruption in general or to compel disclosure of all contributions and expenditures in order to guard against
improper influence of large amounts of money on officeholders. There
is no necessary implication that Congress may limit the amounts spent
in elections.
Expenditure limitations have been part of federal law for more than
sixty years, 6 ' and twenty-nine states have some form of expenditure
limits in their corrupt practices legislation. 38 The poverty of case law
dealing with such limits is undoubtedly attributable to the simple fact
that the limits have not heretofore been enforced. State v. Kohler,36 a
1930 Wisconsin decision, is the only case construing such limitations.
It sustained a statute limiting the amount which might be spent by
candidates and their personal campaign committees. The opinion in
-256 U.S. 232 (1921).
36110 U.S. at 667.
365290 U.S. at 545.
3"See cases cited note 200 supra.
3
17See text accompanying notes 128-32 supra.

nBOOK OF THE STATES 1970-71, at 44-47 (Council of State Governments 1970). Four of these
29 states impose limitations only on primaries. Id. The limitations of 13 states include amounts
spent in behalf of candidates, while 37 states do not go beyond limiting the candidate himself. Id.
36200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895 (1930).
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Kohler is an early example of balancing in which the court addressed
the first amendment implications of expenditure limitations. One case
throughout all the years of political expenditure control laws, however,
is not strong support for the constitutionality of legislation that trenches
so directly into first amendment freedoms.
There are other state court cases which have sustained statutes
requiring that candidates appoint campaign treasurers through whom
all campaign contributions and expenditures be channeled.3 10 The British candidate-accountability statute, 71 which was the first law of its
kind and which forbids expenditures except by the candidate or his
authorized agent, would be clearly unconstitutional in this country.
Most comparable United States statutes do not expressly forbid expenditures by others but require that if they are made on behalf of candidates, they must be reported as part of his contributions or expenditures.
The prior restraint involved in simple accountability statutes can probably be justified by the fact that, without them, the public's first amendment right to know who is spending large amounts in whose behalf
would effectively be frustrated. The Florida law3 72 which is the leading
United States candidate-accountability statute, appears to have been
successful in furthering disclosure, 37 3 but unlike the Federal Campaign
Act, it does not include limitations on the amount of expenditures. For
that reason the Florida statute and other candidate-accountability or
"agency" statutes do not directly invade first amendment political expression, even if they do violate the privacy of political speech. The
tendency of candidates under such statutes is to approve expenditures
initiated by others unless the material involved is, in the candidate's
judgment, seriously damaging, in which event the "supporter" is free to
publish it with a prominent, disclaimer. When expenditure limitations
are coupled with candidate-accountability, however, as in the Federal
Act 3 T the pressure on candidates to use their allotted limits for those
expenditures which say exactly what they wish to have said is vastly
increased. Candidates would, therefore, correspondingly increase their
censorship over the speech of supporters and independents, especially
when the phrase "by or on behalf of" candidates is broadly con3'See cases cited notes 301-03 supra.
''Representation of the People Act, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 65, § 42(l) (1948).
"'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161 (1960).
"'See Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who Gave It-Who Got It" Law, 27 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 434 (1964).
"'Campaign Act § 104(a)(l)-(3), 86 Stat. 5-6.
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strued.37 5 Such control over non-candidate supporters, whether exercised directly by the law itself restraining supporters' activities 370 or
indirectly by the pressure of expenditure limitations on the candidates'
willingness to approve and charge to his limit expenditures initiated by
others, is clearly unconstitutional. And it is that likelihood of candidate
censorship over supporters which, when added to the limitations imposed on the amount of the candidates' own speech, makes the Federal
Campaign Act a double-barreled assault on freedom of speech. If the
candidate refuses to allow the proposed publication to be charged to his
limit, he is infringing the political expression of others, either by suppressing it entirely, burdening it with a disclaimer requirement, or subjecting its maker to criminal sanctions for violating the Campaign Act's
candidate-accountability provisions. The expenditure limitations will
inevitably tend, therefore, to encourage candidates to refuse permission
pro forma, thereby giving their supporters the legal justification for
establishing and multiplying "independent" committees. In the unlikely
event that the candidate grants his approval of the proposed publication,
he effectively loses the initiative in shaping his campaign, which no
canny politician would find tolerable. Hence, so long as expenditure
limitations are part of the statutory scheme, candidate-accountability
must be regarded as an extremely serious threat to matters protected
by the first amendment.
Furthermore, it is difficult to deny that "limit" has essentially the
same meaning as "abridge," which the first amendment expressly forbids. Professor Ralph Winter has put the point exactly:
A limit on the amount an individual may contribute to a political
campaign is a limit on the amount of political activity in which he may
engage. A limit on what a candidate may spend is a limit on his
political speech as well as on the political speech of those who can no
longer effectively contribute money to his campaign. In all the debate
surrounding the First Amendment, one point is agreed upon by everyone: no matter what else the rights of free speech and association do
they protect explicit political activity. But limitations on campaign
spending and contributing expressly set a maximum on the political
activity in which persons may engage. .

.

. The First Amendment

prohibits the setting of a legal maximum on the political activity in
which an individual may engage. This is the case whether or not the
maximum is imposed in the name of equalizing opportunity or whether
-1See note 303 supra.
37
State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 158 N.W. 696 (1916).
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an actual discriminatory effect can be shown. Even under a "balancing" test, such regulation is invalid because there is no countervailing
interest (for example, preserving public peace) to "balance" against
the restriction on speech. In other words, the restriction is imposed not
to preserve some other legitimate interest of society but solely for the
sake of restricting the speech itself-for the sake, indeed, of affecting
the political outcome. But that is precisely what the First Amendment
is all about. 7
Eight members of the House Administration Committee agreed with
Professor Winter, quoting his hearings testimony in their minority report.3 18 The same conclusion was reached by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in invalidating a statute prohibiting citizens from spending money
in political campaigns outside their own county:
We are by no means unmindful of the high and admirable purposes
which inspired the authors of the Corrupt Practices Act. There is no
member of this bench who is not in the fullest sympathy with any
legislation which will tend to reduce to an absolute minimum the danger of corruption and coercion during political campaigns, but when
such a law goes beyond regulation, and absolutely prohibits that which
the Constitution expressly protects, the Court can do nothing but say
79
3

so.

There is a second defect in the limitation rationale: the government
arrogates the right to determine how much speech is permissible. Professor Emerson has posed the following question:
If the government can equalize the amount of speech uttered in a
campaign, by controlling the volume of expenditures for expression,
why cannot it equalize the amount of speech uttered on any subject?
Is it the implication of the Burroughsdecision that the government has
almost unlimited power to allocate resources available for expression,
or to regulate access to the marketplace of ideas?"'
These sources suggest that any limit placed on the amount which a
person can speak, which takes out of his exclusive judgment the decision
of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free speech. It cannot be
described as other than an "authoritative" determination of how much
3

"Winter, Money, Politics and the FirstAmendment, in CAMPAIGN FINANCES 45, 60 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1971).
m
1H.R. REP. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1972).
"'State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 621, 158 N.W. 696, 698 (1916).
uT. EMERSON, supra note 87, at 639.
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is exactly what the first amendment forbids the
speech is enough, which
381
government to do.
Expenditure limitations have a third flaw: by definition they constrict the amount of political information available to the public."' The
more money spent in publicizing political speech, the more information
will be available to voters in choosing among competing candidates.
Any quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of public information and runs counter to our "profound
national commitment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. 1383 Indeed, the public's first amendment rights
not only protect the media from negative governmental restraints, 384
but also are sufficient to permit Congress to expand that public discourse in those media over which it has direct control. 385 And if "it can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional 'guarantee' has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office, ' 386 how can any contraction of the public's fund of discourse
3
be squared with the Congress' obligation always to expand it? 11
One way in which it might conceivably be squared is to introduce
an equality-of-communications-access criterion and to argue that equal
limitations for opposing candidates for the same office prevent "either
side from flooding the media with a single point of view . . . [and]

prevent one candidate from destroying, by sheer volume rather than by
reason, the effectiveness of informational advertising presented by op3"See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 364, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand,

J.).
3"There is therefore an effect in restricting expenditures for the publicizing of
political views not inherently present in restricting other types of expenditures, namely,
that it necessarily deprives the electorate, the persons entitled to hear, as well as the
author of the utterance, whether an individual or a group, of the advantages of free and

full discussion and of the right of free assembly for that purpose.
The most complete exercise of those rights is essential to the full, fair and untrammeled operation of the electoral process. To the extent they are curtailed the electorate

is deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function.
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

mSee Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron,
401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Mills v.Alabama, 384
U.S. 214 (1966), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

3"See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), sustaining the "fairness
doctrine" and an FCC order to a station compelling it to allow a person attacked on a broadcast
to have a chance to respond.
mMonitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
nSee Redish, supra note 12.
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posing candidates. ' 38 This argument, however, assumes that someone-presumably Congress-knows how much information is the right
amount and reflects a basic distrust in the capacity of individual citizens
to discount the greater volume of political advertising in reaching their
decisions.
Another way is to argue that limitations in fact expand public
political discourse by preventing so much political campaigning that the
public is forced either to suffer repeated bouts of sensory overload or
to tune out the superfluous increment. Each person's sensory limit is
different, however, and some members of the public-presumably those
most interested in politics-will remain hungry for more information
after those with a lower information threshold have tuned out. Those
who are sated easily and have tuned out gain nothing from limitations.
Justifying limitations as means of protecting the public from confusion
therefore gains nothing for the public at great cost to free speech.
On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, it can be concluded that
candidates, their supporters, and others wishing to participate in elections have a presumptively protected right to decide without government
regulation how much money to spend in elections and for what purposes. Because a very strong argument can be made that contribution
and spending limits directly and inevitably infringe that right, it may be
that the Court would not even consider the governmental interest asserted to justify them, holding instead that there can be no "balancing"
when first amendment rights are themselves directly, rather than incidentally, circumscribed. The gravity of the need to preserve the integrity
of democracy's ultimate decision-making process suggests, however,
that the Court would insist on weighing that interest, and it is therefore
necessary to examine carefully the social interest furthered by these
provisions of the Campaign Act.
The Legitimacy and Weight of the Governmental Interest in Limiting
Contributionsand Expenditures
The legislative history of the Campaign Act suggests that the chief
goal of the contribution and expenditure limitations is to imbue the
federal election process with a greater measure of equal political opportunity. 389 The legislation is premised on the conviction that campaign
2Comment,

7 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV., supra note 351, at 228.
"IS. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. REP. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. REP. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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costs are, as the Senate Commerce Committee declared in reporting the
bill, so high and "rapidly escalating" as to pose "a real and imminent
danger to the integrity of the electoral process."a3 ° The nature of that
danger is, in the words of witnesses before the House Committee on
Administration, "that a system which sets no overall limits on campaign
spending in federal elections may lead to a closed, insulated, selfperpetuating system, dominated by special interests and unresponsive to
the public will and which often creates the impression that only the rich
can run for public office, and that a candidate can buy an election by
spending large amounts of money in a campaign." '' The present system, the House Committee went on,
works an inequitable hardship on the candidate who cannot compete
with the resources of great wealth, but of even greater significance, it
is unfair to the electorate which is entitled to have presented to it for
its evaluation and judgment candidates from all walks of life and not
just those persons who, because of their wealth, can conduct a campaign which resorts to techniques which are more appropriate to merchandizing a product than to familiarizing the public with a candidate's qualities
as a potential public official and his program for the
93
country.
By placing a ceiling on media expenditures and on candidates' personal
and family contributions, therefore, the Act attempts to enhance the
citizens' equality of opportunity to compete for public office and to
assure the public the opportunity to choose among the best available
candidates irrespective of financial condition.
In short, high campaign costs are presumed to have three major
consequences: deterrence of office-seekers, undue financial advantage,
and undue financial influence. They allegedly deter some able and otherwise presumably willing candidates from running, thereby denying the
public some talented servants as well as infringing the rights of the
would-be candidate. They allegedly give an undue electoral advantage
to those candidates from wealthy families or with wealthy friends and
interest groups. They allegedly create the need for candidates to indenture themselves to wealthy interests eager to gain advantage at public
expense.
There is no question but that these are serious and legitimate concerns. If democracy means anything, in elegant theory as well as in
"S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1971).
1H.R. REP. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
392ld.
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everyday usage, it means that public office should not be only open but
accessible to all citizens with the drive to seek it and the capacity to fill
it. Few Americans could find fault with this ideal or doubt that our
political process will be healthier and our public policies wiser and more
equitable the more we approximate it in practice. The question we must
consider is not whether this ideal is worthy, but whether it is in fact in
danger and, if it is, whether contribution and expenditure limitations
constitute the best means of protecting it.
It must be noted that the concern about deterrence of officeseekers, undue financial advantage, and undue financial influence is not
new. Long before election costs reached anywhere near their present
level, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressed similar concerns in
sustaining Wisconsin's expenditure limitation provision in 1930:
It is a matter of common knowledge that men of limited financial
resources aspire to public office. It is equally well known that successful candidacy often requires them to put themselves under obligation
to those who contribute financial support. If such a candidate is successful, these obligations may be carried over so that they color and
sometimes control official action. The evident purpose of the act is to
free the candidates from the temptation to accept support on such
terms and to place candidates during this period upon a basis of equality so far as their personal ambitions are concerned, permitting them,
however, to make an appeal on behalf of the principles for which they
stand, so that such support as may voluntarily be tendered to the
candidacy of a person will be a support of principle rather than a
personal claim upon the candidate's consideration should he be
elected. .

.

. It may be replied that the act seeks to throw democracy

back upon itself, and so induce spontaneous political action in place
of that which is produced by powerful political and group organizations.

93

The fact that such limits have been no more effective in reducing expenditures in Wisconsin than they have anywhere else they have been
tried 94 should suggest that the causal relationship between limits and
equal political opportunity is illusory. Yet the public belief in that commonsense relationship continues to persist and has led to a national
attempt to impose limits without any serious exploration of the dynamics of election finance, and while one-third of those states that had
33

1 State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 565, 228 N.W. 895, 912 (1930).
ADAMANY, supra note 4, at 120-21.

311D.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

limitations have decided to repeal them. 95
Discourse on the subject continues to be dominated by simplistic
statements that assume, rather than examine, basic premises."9 If we
are to infringe the preferred freedoms of the first amendment, we need
to be certain that the facts justifying the infringement are accurate, that
they constitute a threat to other constitutionally protected rights, and
that the proposed remedy will safeguard the latter while effectively
eliminating the former. Are campaign costs now, or likely to become
in the future, so high that they pose a threat to equal political opportunity? Is it possible to achieve equal political opportunity by legislating
campaign monetary equality and, specifically, media spending equality?
It should be stated at the outset that these questions are not primarily legal ones. Professor Rosenthal has analogized the right to run for
office to the right to vote for office-seekers, of course without in any
way maintaining that they are in fact actually equivalent."9 While
recent cases have sought to ensure the equality of voting and of equal
weighting of votes within jurisdictions, 98 there is quite a difference
between voting, that condition of equality which is indispensable in a
democracy, and equality of candidacy, a condition of equality which
never exists in life. A vote is a simple, discrete, finite occurrence, the
exercise of which is an incident of citizenship. By its nature it depends
only on the citizeh's own volition, subject to minimal residency, registration, and civil eligibility requirements. The closest analogy is a right to
an equal opportunity to qualify to run for office, which is constitutionally protected,399 but it is in no way equivalent to a right to competitive
equality, since by its nature the competitive position of candidates vis '
vis one another depends on a multiplicity of factors, such as political
talent, experience, and knowledge, far beyond the effective power of any
democratic governmental control. Competition for office is premised on
the existence of such inequalities; indeed, the existence of those inequalities is one of the main reasons for choice of public officials in a democracy by citizen vote rather than by lot. But while those chosen among
11H.

ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at

190.

"'See, e.g., Barrow, supra note 12.
7
u A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 24.
ulCity of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating property ownership as

a prerequisite of voting in bond and school tax elections); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969) (same); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (same); Harper v.

Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating the poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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may be inherently unequal and incapable of being made equal, the
choice itself acquires its democratic and equal character by the equallyweighted votes of citizens.
It can be countered that while most candidate characteristics are
inherently unequal and constitute the reason for choice, financial resources are neither an inborn characteristic of people nor incapable of
being equalized. Carrying the point even further, it can be contended
that it is only as such secondary and unnatural inequalities as financial
resources are equalized that the primary and inherent personal inequalities can be given full weight by the voters.
This contention certainly seems persuasive, but it misperceives the
nature of political campaign funding. The amount of money a candidate
can raise for an election is ordinarily more a reflection of the extent of
his potential support than it is a means of obtaining support. It is a
direct function of perceived political promise. Likely winners can raise
more money than likely losers. Large resources for campaign use are
attracted by a candidate's other characteristics-the ones that are inherently unequal-and not vice versa. The frequency and public reporting
of opinion polling on comparative candidate strengths make it increasingly easy for campaign donors to have reliable data on which to determine whether and to whom to give. If there is any doubt about that
relationship, one need only contrast Senator McGovern's difficulty in
obtaining funds before Wisconsin, when he was a perceived loser, with
his financial attractiveness after his victory there,"0 or Senator Muskie's
ease in obtaining funds when he appeared the likely Democratic candidate with his inability to raise funds after his series of primary defeats.",
The fact is, as Professor Dahl pointed out, that the resources a
candidate brings into his pursuit of office include many assets in addition to money."0 A candidate's general intelligence, time available, personal contacts, issue association, prior name-recognition, public reputation, past record, political organization, and political talent and skills
play a substantial role in his capacity to win elections. Money is obviously important, too, but as Professor Key observed, it "is not the sole
currency of politics. 4' 3 It is much more in the nature of an instrumental resource rather than a primary resource, and the capacity to raise it
depends in large part on the candidate's other political resources.
'®N.Y. Times, April 26, 1972, at 28, cols. 6 & 7.
"'N.Y. Times, April 10, 1972, at 30, cols. I & 2.
102R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 226 (1961).
113D. ADAMANY, supra note 4, at 7-12.
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Obviously, this relationship between money and political success is
a complex and dynamic one, subject to probability estimates by the
public. Conceivably, the candidates most likely to win should attract the
largest amount of money, and winning would be confirmation of the
prediction rather than a consequence of high spending. But we know
that the highest spenders do not always win."' In the 1970 elections,
those statewide candidates spending more for political broadcasting, for
example, won only marginally more frequently than their opponents,
although larger spenders did better in the House races:" 5
CANDIDATES OUTSPENDING OPPONENTS

Winners
Governor
Senate
House

19
20
229

54.3%
57.1%
64.7%

Losers
16
15
125

45.7%
42.9%
35.3%

CANDIDATES WHO WERE INCUMBENTS

Winners
Governor
Senate
House

17
24
379

70.8%
80.0%
96.7%

Losers
7
6
13

29.2%
20.0%
3.3%

In four out of the five races for Senate and six out of the eleven races
for governor which did not involve incumbents, the largest spender
lost." 6 In five of the last six Presidential elections, the Republicans
outspent the Democrats, but won in only three. In those three (1952,
1956, and 1968), they outspent the Democrats by fifty percent or
more, 07 but in all of them the non-financial factors that enabled them
to raise so much more than the Democrats in the first place were probably of much greater consequence in producing victory than was their
preponderance in campaign expenditures.
These figures suggest that the closer the race is on the basis of nonfinancial factors, the greater the influence the amount of money spent
101A.
HEARD, supra note 4, at 6.
103Broadcast Spending: No Election Guarantee, 29 CONGRESSIONAL Q. 1621 (1971).

116d. at 1623-24.
407

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERV., POLITICS IN AMERICA 1945-1968, at 114 (1969).
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will have on the outcome. But the closer the races are on such factors,
the easier it is for both candidates to raise money. It is only in the
lopsided contests that one candidate (the likely winner) has a superior
fundraising advantage over his opponent. But it is only an advantage
and will not necessarily be reflected in spending figures, because the
same factors that make it easier for him to raise money make it unnecessary for him to do so. He is going to win anyway, whether he outspends
his opponent or not.
In races in which the outcome is lopsided, therefore, we would
expect to find that the highest spenders had won fmuch more frequently
than they lost, not because they spent more but because they were much
more likely to win in the first place."' This is exactly what we do find:
in more than ten percent of the 1970 House races, there was no general
election opposition; in about forty percent, the winner won by sixty-five
percent or more; in about forty percent, the winner's margin was ten to
thirty percent; and in fewer than twelve percent of the races was the
winner's margin less than ten percent."' This substantially explains the
reason that the House races appear to be more greatly influenced by
higher spending. The relatively small amount of money usually spent in
a congressional campaign (in no 1970 case more than sixty thousand
dollars for broadcasting) 10 is-inore easily raised than the much larger
sums required for statewide elections. Even financially unattractive candidates, therefore, can frequently raise the funds necessary to wage a
highly visible campaign, and indeed, if they are to have a chance at
winning against an incumbent, they have to spend more than he does.
If many congressional elections matched highly determined but finacially unattractive challengers against confident and financially attractive incumbents, therefore, one would expect to find a larger proportion
of higher spenders losing, because campaigns, costing less, are undertaken more easily against greater odds. The fact that we do not is
explained by incumbents' unwillingness to allow themselves to be outspent.
The main points are that the amount spent in elections does not
determine the winner unless the race is otherwise very close, and that
the amount raised for campaigns is more an indication of the likelihood
of success than a cause of electoral victory. If this is an accurate sum4

'N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1972, at 52, col. 1.

'Penniman, supra note 12, at 14.
"'Broadcast Spending: No Election Guarantee,supra note 405, at 1625, 1627, 1629.
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mary, the concerns about both deterrence of candidates and undue financial advantage would appear to be unfounded. If a candidate appears
likely to win, he will be able to attract the funds necessary to wage a
campaign. The inability of Senator Fred Harris and Nassau County
Executive Eugene Nickerson to raise funds for their respective races for
the Democratic nominations for President' and Governor of New
York4 2 was a symptom of their perceived poor chances of winning
against Senator Muskie and Arthur Goldberg respectively, rather than
a major cause in itself.
The advantage enjoyed by candidates with a higher likelihood of
winning cannot, therefore, be described as undue. It is mainly the reflection of a preponderance of public support, and it thus represents a
prediction of probable success. The fact that people vote with dollars
as well as ballots is to be celebrated in a democracy rather than bemoaned. That those with surplus disposable wealth choose to give for
political campaigns is no less commendable because they give more
generously to those expected to win. Donors contribute for a variety of
reasons, but there is nothing either illegal or improper in the simple fact
that they prefer to support likely winners rather than losers. Obviously
there is a sliding scale at work here. The more intense the prospective
donor's belief in a candidate or his program or the more intense his
dislike of the candidate's opponent, the less likely he will withhold
financial support because of the candidate's poor chance of winning.
This phenomenon ensures that candidates who may appear financially
unattractive to the public as a whole, but who stand for intensely held
or widely shared beliefs among a sub-group in the population, will
nonetheless be able to make a credible entry into the campaign list. In
other words, a candidate will be able to raise sufficient funds to prime
his candidacy and to show the skeptics, as well as the public to whom
he is unfamiliar, how well-suited he is for their votes and wider financial
support. This seems to be precisely what occurred in the McCarthy,
Wallace, and McGovern candidacies.
Although we have seen that there is little substance to the fears of
deterrence of candidates or undue financial advantage, it might still be
argued in principle that because the election process is of such central
importance to democratic government, irrespective of deterrence and
"'N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1971, at 21, cols. 1 & 2.
"'Hearingon PoliticalBroadcastingbefore the Subcomm. on Communicationsand Power of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1970).
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undue advantage, it is improper to allow money to play so large a role
in elections. Does not the involvement of large sums of money tend to
contaminate the election process?
Most of the scholars of election finance agree that such is not the
case. Despite the public's perception to the contrary (eighty percent of
Americans would like to see ceilings imposed on campaign spending),"'
the experts believe that United States elections are underfinanced by
comparision with those of other countries and with appropriate indices
of our own spending for other goods and services.4 14 Furthermore, election expenditures as a proportion of national income and wealth have
not risen at all; rather, they have declined. Political expenditures were
four percent of the gross national product in 1952 but only 3.5 percent
in 1968.111 The percentage increase in national income during the same
period was twice that of the increase in political expenditures.4 1 6 In
comparison with political expenditures per voter in other industrial
democracies, expenditures in the United States ranked behind Israel,
Italy, Japan, and Germany and only slightly ahead of the United King417
dom.
It is true, however, that political spending has risen faster than the
consumer price index and has increased considerably more than the rise
in the voting age population.41 s This can be explained, however, as a
function of the greatly increased expenditures in the general category
of which political broadcasting, the major component responsible for
rapidly increasing political expenditures, 419 is itself one subsidiary spending category. National television advertising tripled from 1956 to 1970,
rising from 1.2 billion dollars to 3.7 billion dollars. 4 0 This was a slightly
greater increase than occurred in campaign expenditures as a whole, and
was only slightly less than the increase in political broadcasting itself,
which quadrupled during the same period.4 21 This suggests that the polit"'See H.R. REP. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1971).
"Hearings on H.R. 13721, H.R. 13722, H.R. 13751, H.R. 13752, H.R. 13935, H.R. 14047,
H.R. 14511, and S. 3637 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1970). See also HEARD,
supra note 4, at 375-87.
"'Penniman, supra note 12, at 8.
''D. ADAMANY, supra note 4, at 58.

1'1d. at 57.
'D. DUNN, supra note 4, at 44.
11R. MAcNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE 228-39 (1968).

"'141

TELEVISION FACTBOOK

73-a (1972).

'I'D. DUNN, supra note 4 at 32.
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ical broadcasting increase from 1952 to the present has been substantially caused by the increasing use of television generally as a means of
communication within the society. 2' Furthermore, future increases are
not likely to be as large as those immediately past, because the use of
political broadcasting has probably reached the saturation point. Its
rate of future increase would seem likely to slow markedly to a rate
more closely related to the increase in the consumer price index. As a
result, the imposition of the proposed ceilings, which were pegged at or
slightly higher than the level of current expenditures, will have little
effect. The largest increase in political broadcasting costs is very likely
behind us and the Act requires only minor reduction. If high political
broadcast costs are the target, the barn door has been closed too late.
As Herbert Alexander has pointed out numerous times,423 the total
amount spent for all kinds of expenses on all political campaigns is less
than the combined advertising of the top two manufacturing firms in the
nation.4 24 Finally, and most important, as a proportion of total campaign expenditures, actual political broadcasting expenditures for time
purchased have risen only slightly in the last four elections: 6.5 percent
in 1956, 8 percent in 1960, 12 percent in 1964, and 13 percent in 1968.423
Yet this category of expenditure is the only one on which the Act places
a ceiling, and the fact that federal supervision over broadcasting obviously makes it more easily and reliably controlled does not justify
singling out this one area for limitation, particularly when it constitutes
the primary speech dimension of the election campaign.
Spending limitations are often justified as a means of limiting the
"undue influence" of money in campaigns. The term itself is terribly
vague and suggests an implicit reference to some standard of what is
not "undue. ' 42 What varieties of influence on officeholders are
4"41 TELEVISION FACTBOOK 76-a to 77-a (1972).
2'See Hearings on H.R. 13721, H.R. 13722, H.R. 13751, H.R. 13752, H.R. 13935, H.R.
14047, H.R. 14511, and S. 3637, supra note 414.
42
Procter and Gamble ($199,000,000) and General Motors ($129,200,000). ADVERTISINO Ao,
July 24, 1972, at 55.
"'See D. DUNN, supra note 4, at 32.
4
Z'See United States v. CIO, 355 U.S. 106, 145 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring):
It is not necessary now to consider whether restricting the rights of individuals,
singly or in organized relationships, to publicize their political views, rights often essential to their survival and always to their well-being, can be accommodated, in some
instances, with the Amendment's purpose or justified because in legislative judgment
those persons, unless restricted, acquire "undue influence" in the electoral process. For
"undue influence" in this connection may represent no more than convincing weight of
argument fully presented, which is the very thing the Amendment and the electoral
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"undue"? Is not the influence of his family, or his old and close friends,
his special policy concerns also "undue" in comparison with the influence of strangers, individual voters, or matters about which he does not
particularly care? Is the influence of money on politicians any greater
or more dangerous?
Whatever is meant by "undue," it can be controlled much more
effectively and in ways more consonant with democratic practices by
requiring full disclosure of donors. That is the device most used to guard
against other kinds of undue influence, and there is no reason to believe
that it would be less effective in preventing the "undue" influence of
money in elections, if full and timely disclosure is effected.
In principle, then, it is far from clear that the governmental interest
that expenditure and contribution limitations are designed to serve is
sufficiently compelling to warrant the incursion of such limitations on
first amendment freedoms. It would seem obvious that the interest involved does not pass the test described by Mr. Justice Rutledge:
The loss inherent in restrictions upon expenditures for publicizing
views. . . forces upon its authors the burden of justifying the contraction by demonstrating indubitable public advantage arising from the
restriction outweighing all disadvantages, thus reversing the direction
of presumptive weight in other cases.4 2
Whatever doubt remains about the Campaign Act's unconstitutionality
in principle, however, should be dispelled on examination of the particular means chosen.
The Appropriateness of the CongressionalMeans
Because of the presumptive first amendment protection of the activities constrained by the expenditure and contribution limitations, the
standard by which the congressional means are tested for constitutionality is very stringent. As discussed earlier,42 8 the means chosen must be
designed logically to achieve the ends;42 9 they must not "broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
process it protects were intended to bring out. And one may question how far legislators
may go in accurately assessing undue disproportionate weight as distinguished from
making substantially accurate findings and conclusions concerning corruption.
4
'United States v. CIO, 355 U.S. 106, 140-45 (1948). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
'2See text accompanying notes 249-50 supra.
"'Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

achieved," and they "must be viewed in the light of less drastic means
of achieving the same basic purpose."43 0 Under all three of these
tests-rational relation, minimal infringement, and comparative harmfulness-the expenditure and contribution limitations clearly fail. These
provisions are likely to be inefficacious in remedying the alleged evils
of undue financial influence, undue financial advantage, and deterrence
of candidates; indeed, they increase the imbalance in favor of incumbents. Furthermore, because the alternative of public subsidy does not
infringe the free speech of candidates and their supporters, more directly
serves the goal of equal political opportunity, and more effectively addresses the most serious problem of financial barriers to seeking public
office, the limitation of expenditures and contributions must be regarded as unconstitutional.
Discriminationin General. A limitation of media expenditures not
only singles out the speech dimension for special assault, but also discriminates very strongly in favor of candidates with preexisting reputations, extensive name-recognition by the public, wide public association
with particular issue positions, preexisting news media editorial support,
and preestablished political organizations. In other words, a candidate
who is already well-known and who has a working political organization
is not seriously hampered in his campaign because the Act does not limit
" ' telephones
the amount of money spent on paid campaign workers,43
(other than automatic telephone banks), postage, and printing-all the
usual means of energizing a political organization. Furthermore, the
Act places no limit on volunteer workers, which gives a decided advantage to candidates supported by groups whose members can be easily
mobilized for canvassing and voter registration, such as student groups,
labor unions, and trade associations. Moreover, candidates who have
strong organizations but little natural talent for television campaigning
are favored over candidates who have little preexisting political organization and name recognition but who are good television campaigners
and who might be able, but for the media limitation, to compensate for
other lacks by spending more in media campaigning. If it is true that
the most effective use of commercial advertising is in the introduction
of new brands and products,432 it would follow that the most effective
'1Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

"1The only limitation applies to expenditures for broadcast time and the agent's commissions
thereon; newspaper, magazine and outdoor billboard space; and automated telephone banks. Campaign Act §§ 103-04, 86 Stat. 5-6.
'rrelser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964).
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use of political advertising would be to introduce new candidates to the
public. In effect, candidates who already rank high on the prime election
resources are further advantaged by a media limit which prevents their
opponents from outspending them through the single most effective
means of becoming known to the public.
The media expenditure limit discriminates similarly against the
candidates of parties with significantly fewer registered voters. In traditionally one-party districts, the only way the minority party candidate
has even a remote chance of effectively overcoming his opponent's disproportionately high registration advantage is by more intensive use of
media. To hold the candidates of both parties to the same limit tends
33
to solidify the institutional bias rather than to diminish it.1
In addition, the candidate contribution limitations discriminate
against wealthy candidates at the same time that other provisions of the
Act are easing restrictions on political contributions by labor unions and
corporations and removing the ceiling on contributions by noncandidate donors. One of the purposes of the media expenditures limit
was to diminish the need of candidates to become indebted to special
interests. Yet not only does the Act facilitate the making of large contributions by special corporate and labor interests, it also forces a candidate to seek support from others by placing ceilings on the amount a
candidate can contribute to or raise from his family for his own campaign and thereby creates the potential for increased influence by
wealthy special interests.
Finally, discrimination is inherent in the imposition of nationwide
expenditure limits irrespective of varying needs for aid costs of media
from place to place. The limits are essentially irrelevant in urban congressional campaigns in very large metropolitan areas, where television
is a less useful campaign tool. A single district often contains so small
a fraction of the metropolitan television audience, and the advertising
rates, being based on total metropolitan population, are so high that
political television advertising is an economically inefficient means of
reaching it. Besides, the districts are compact enough and population
density sufficiently high to lend themselves to other modes of campaigning, such as mailings, local meetings, and personal canvassing, that are
not covered by the expenditure limit. Hence the Act places a burden on
"'This was the logic of the proposal by John Walker, the 1972 Republican candidate for
Lieutenant-Governor of North Carolina, that he and Jim Hunt, his opponent, agree on a spending
limit formula which permitted him to spend five times the amount his opponent could spend.
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congressional candidacies in many parts of the country that it does not
in fact impose on metropolitan candidacies. 34
Discrimination in Favor of Incumbents. We have already noted
that spending limits favor those candidates with large accumulations of
such political resources as public familiarity, working organizations,
and press attention.43 By definition incumbents constitute the largest
group of candidates with preexisting reputations and followings. Media
campaigning is less crucial to them than to their challengers. Indeed,
the more senior an incumbent in years of service, the less he needs to
spend on media in order to win. A recent study by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York revealed that half of the responding
congressional incumbents reported spending no money at all on television advertising during their most recent contested election and that
heavy television campaign usage was reported by senior senators and
congressmen only half as frequently as it was by junior members of
Congress.43 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a Congress
dominated by incumbents should single out for limitation those elements of carripaign expenditure that are least important to their own
campaigns. But it is not only that they need broadcasting less, but that
their challengers need it infinitely more. Limitations on media spending,
therefore, while being relatively harmless to incumbents, can be disastrous to the chances of challengers. It is for this reason that incumbents
looking to their own self-interest tend to favor media limitations over
other forms of expenditures limits. 3 Indeed, a reading of the hearings
on the proposals that became the 1971 Act suggests that the dominant
motive behind the media expenditures limit was, as Russell Hemenway,
director of the National Committeee for an Effective Congress, observed, a fear of "the media blitz."43
The discriminatory impact of media expenditure limits on challengers was repeatedly noted in the hearings. Congressman Harvey (Republican from Michigan) asserted that "[t]he whole theory of putting a limit
on the amount you can spend really lessens the opportunity for a challenge or lessens the possibilities of a challenger being successful.""43
"'See S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1971).
-'1Seenote 431 and accompanying text supra.
'"'SPECIAL COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE
YORK, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 140-41 (1970).
431
D. DUNN, supra note 4, at 59.
3

CITY OF NEw

'Hearings on H.R. 8284 Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the House Comm. on House
Administration, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
' 3'Id. at*35.
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Congressman Frenzel (Republican from Minnesota) put the point even
more concretely:
This is the section of the bill that almost guarantees successful reelection of incumbents. It is difficult to argue against incumbents in this
Congress. Challengers have a mighty small constituency here, nevertheless every election includes at least half challengers.
In the election of 1970, 93 percent of incumbents that sought
reelection were re-elected. Incumbents already have enormous advantages which need not be increased by excessive low-spending limitations.
A $50,000 limitation for a Congressional campaign may sound
generous to incumbents whose re-election does not require spending of
amounts anywhere near that figure. For the challenger the limitation
imposes nearly impossible problems. With today's costs there is no
way a challenger can make himself
known over a well-identified in440
cumbent under these restrictions.
This overt discrimination against challengers is made even more
burdensome by the failure of the Act to equalize innumerable publicly
subsidized advantages enjoyed by incumbents running for reelection.
Incumbents have free mailing privileges which entitle them to mail at
taxpayer cost anything short of an out-right political appeal for support.
Even during a campaign, an incumbent congressman can and does mail
materials, often free government publications, to constituents with an
enclosed personal message without any cost to his campaign. If he
exceeds his printing allowance in so doing, he can deduct the excess cost
from his income for tax purposes; a challenger can deduct nothing. 44'
Congressman Frenzel remarked on the magnitude of these advantages
as follows:
Some Congressmen generate sometimes 100,000 letters to people who
have written them before or whose names are known to the Congressman on subjects of which the Congressman is aware that particular
constituent is interested in. It seems to me that this is a very potent
political weapon to which the challenger has no counterpart. He has
no way to challenge this weaponry. 442
There are countless other publicly subsidized incumbent expenses,
such as 125,000 dollars in staff allowances, 4,800 dollars for district
44

H.R. REP. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971); see 1971 Hearings 19.
"'See I.T. 4095, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 90.
421971

Hearings65.
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office space rental and equipment, 35,000 minutes of long-distance telephone service, 480,000 heavy-duty brown envelopes, 700 dollars worth
of stamps and some transportation allowances. 43
While such tax-supported expenses cannot be directly spent for
political purposes, it is impossible to sort out, even in an election campaign, those activities that are primarily politically oriented from those
that are primarily oriented to representation of constituents.
All of these incumbent advantages were left unlimited by the 1971
Act, and no provision was enacted to extend their benefits to challengers. Instead, challengers were further disadvantaged in relation to incumbents by the media expenditure limit. It is not difficult to understand why Congress chose this particular mode of regulation. As Professor Winter observed, "[M]any of those who are most anxious for legislation benefit from the activities that are left unregulated."",
Finally, the coup de grace of incumbency benefit is the retention
by congressmen of supervision over the administration of the regulation
of their own campaigns. While the Senate version of the Act would have
placed supervisory responsibility for House and Senate campaigns in the
Comptroller General, an independent officer even if responsible to Congress, the Conference Committee accepted the House version, which
retained such responsibility respectively in the Clerk of the House and
the Secretary of the Senate.445 Even before the ink on the Act had time
to dry, such objective supervision as the House Clerk might have given
to the Act was challenged by Representative Wayne Hays, Chairman
of the House Administration Committee, who proposed that his committee take over supervision from the Clerk.44 One need not be cynical
to question the objectivity of the supervision likely to be provided.
Whatever benefits for incumbents the Act failed expressly to provide or
to retain would most certainly be supplied by such administration of the
Act.
In view of all of these incumbent advantages, it is difficult not to
sympathize with Congressman Frenzel's questioning of expenditure limitations:
What I am trying to find out from some witness is what is so bad about
campaign spending. I am trying to find somebody to show me there is
'"Penniman, supra note 12, at 17.
'"Winter, supra note 377, at 59.
'S. REP. No. 92-580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1971).

"'It should be noted that Mr. Hays himself failed to file his own campaign report by the first
deadline. COMMON CAUSE, May 1972, at 2.

FEDERAL CAMPAIGN ACT

19731

an abuse here. I have tried to take a very unpopular position of being
for a nonincumbent trying to take on the guy who has all the advantages of name recognition, popularity, access to the media, a limited
franking privilege, et cetera, et cetera. This poor guy has to arise from
nowhere and take on such distinguished people as these you see before
you. This is a very difficult task and history shows they are very
unsuccessful at it. . . When you establish a spending limitation you
literally insure that incumbents are not going to be defeated because
the only weapon the [non-] incumbent has against name recognition,
access to media, franking, et cetera, is to get his name known, get
around and have people get the idea he is important or smart.
So it seems to me unless you can prove we are doing something
just awful in campaign spending, you are going to create a far larger
evil by seeking limitations.4"
The Campaign Act Fails to Achieve Its Objectives. In addition to
the overtly discriminatory effects of the Campaign Act, it fails to pass
the rational relation test in a more fundamental way. By any sanguine
estimate, the Act simply will not control the level of overall campaign
expenditures, it will not even control the level of media expenditures,
and it will not reduce the extent of deterrence to impecunious would-be
candidates. Finally, its enforcement mechanism will not provide the

public with reliable, even-handed, non-partisan administration of federal elections.
It has already been noted that the Act does not limit overall cam-

paign expenditure levels.4 Even if candidates abided strictly by the
media limitations, they would be holding constant a category of expend-

iture which, as we have seen, comprised only thirteen percent of total
political spending in 1968. With any serious competitive pressure on a

candidate to spend more than his opponent in order to win a closely
contested election, it would be a fairly simple matter to increase spend-

ing for other, non-regulated purposes, such as for paid campaign workers, professional campaign management, mailings, brochures, and polling. These categories, which represent eighty-seven percent of political
spending, have no ceiling. This permits campaign costs to continue to
escalate, thus not alleviating any grounds for concern about undue fin-

ancial advantage, deterrence of candidates, and undue financial influence.

Furthermore, media expenditures are not effectively controlled.
111971 Hearings 85.
"'See note 431 and accompanying text supra.
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First, the Act does not limit general party efforts in behalf of all party
candidates. 49 It thus leaves local, district, state, and national party
organizations free to spend without limit in support of all candidates,
so long as no particular race is singled out for special emphasis.
Secondly, a large category of media-related expenses themselves is
not embraced in the ceiling. The limit applies only to expenditures for
time and space, and the commissions paid to time buyers on such purchases, and does not restrain expenditures for related expenses. Thus the
production costs (for writing, photographing, editing, professional producers and directors, and media consultants) and promotional costs are
left absolutely free to rise, and they have been estimated to represent
expenditures amounting to from twenty-five to thirty-three percent of
time charges.4"' This omission from coverage seems likely to cause shifts
of funds into media categories other than actual space or time expenditures.
Thirdly, the media limitations will not effectively limit direct expenditures for media because the limitations depend for their effectiveness on an unconstitutional exercise of a veto by candidates over their
supporters. If the limitations are to be effective, the candidate has to
be able to forbid his supporters from buying time or space. If he does
forbid such expression and they abide by his decision, he clearly violates
their first amendment rights. If they do not abide by his decision and
use the time or space with the appropriate disclaimer of candidate responsibility, the limit is vitiated. In either fashion the rights of supporters to free political speech are violated, by suppression in the first instance and by a substantial previous restraint in the second.
There seems to be little doubt that a candidate veto over supporters
would be unconstitutional. 451 As Professor Rosenthal observed, "I have
not encountered any proposal that would provide really effective limits
on campaign expenditures without giving rise to the most serious doubts
as to the constitutionality of the restraints placed upon his supporters. ' 45 2 This is not to say that a case cannot be made for candidate
control:
"'Thus party expenditures for media urging votes for all Democratic or Republican candidates, but mentioning none by name, are not within the scope of the Act; only specific candidates
have limits.
1H. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 256.
"'Cf A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 66 (statement of Professor Bickel), 75 (statement of
Professor Freund).
'"1Id. at 37-38.
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A person seeking office.

. .

owes to the public the duty of supervising

the conduct of his campaign so that it is honest and fair. It should not
be possible for him to evade this duty simply by delegating the conduct

of his campaign to others, or by ignoring the questionable practices of
committees formed to support him. The public interest demands that

a candidate be responsible for the conduct of those working in his
behalf, and the law should aid him in the performance of this duty by

making it impossible for53assistance to be given him except with his
knowledge and consent.
Such wistful yearning for a neat British-like centralization of responsibility in the candidate flies not only in the face of the first amendment,
but also ignores the extraordinarily decentralized nature of American
politics. In statewide, national, and congressional-district races, the
practice has always been for city and county committees to take their
own initiatives in campaigning, including the writing of advertising copy
and the raising of funds to purchase the time or space to run it. This
permits local supporters to emphasize local concerns in campaign advertising and leaves ample room for creative and varying local initiatives.
The requirement that a district or statewide candidate or his agent
approve such local efforts in his behalf will stifle local initiative. In a
statewide campaign with as many as several hundred local managers
submitting copy, the approval process is likely to be an administrative
catastrophe as well as a funeral for imagination.
An analogous tradition of individual political initiative has long
been part of American campaigning. Many individual citizens, some
with large amounts of money and some with little, prefer taking their
own public stands in their own words to working through an official
campaign structure. In 1968, for example, Stewart Mott took several
newspaper advertisements in behalf of his "Coalition for a Republican
Alternative" in order to persuade Governor Rockefeller to oppose the
Vietnam war and to contest Nixon for the Presidency. 54 His effort did
not have Rockefeller approval, yet it can hardly be denied that it aided
the Rockefeller candidacy. In 1972 Mott similarly placed advertisements implicitly supporting Senator McGovern against Senator Muskie
in the New Hampshire primary, again without the approval of the
former. 55 More recently, David Merrick placed an advertisement at the
'"Comment, Campaign Contributions and Expenditures in California,41 CALIF. L. REV.
300, 307 (1953).
"'Alexander & Myers, A FinancialLandslidefor G.O.P., FORTUNE, Mar. 1970, at 107.
I"N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1972, at 26, col. 1.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

bottom of the front page of the New York Times which said, "In 1972
it's hard to vote Democratic." While his intent is clear, the text required
no approval from Nixon, and was not chargeable to his limit. Professor
Daniel Pollitt, of the University of North Carolina Law School, wrote
the Times and enclosed a check, seeking to insert a similar advertisement which said, "In 1972, Nixon makes it easy to vote Democratic."
The Times refused to run the ad unless it were approved by McGovern
or run with the one-line disclaimer, which would have doubled the
cost."' Under the 1971 Act these advertisements could have appeared
with the disclaimer, but they would nonetheless have helped a specific
candidate without being charged to his limit.45
If a candidate veto is constitutionally impermissible, the essential
means of making spending limits effective collapses. The Senate Commerce Committee recognized this fact in its report:
To contend that limitations would be constitutionally sound with respect to candidates, but to maintain otherwise where their supporters
are concerned, would construe the power of Congress to protect the
election process far too narrowly. Such a construction would permit
boundless evasion of the purpose of the legislation and in effect render
it nugatory.58

It is improbable that candidates will fail to utilize the multicommittee device at national, state, and local levels to evade the media
limits just as presidential candidates evaded the preexisting three million
dollar political committee limit. That likelihood has clearly been enhanced by a recent Internal Revenue Service ruling permitting evasion
of the gift tax on political contributions of more than three thousand
dollars annually through the donation of many three thousand dollar
contributions by the same donor to separate political committees.,"
Furthermore, it would appear that such "independent" committees
would be free to spend as much as they wished so long as their advertisements carried the required disclaimer of candidate responsibility. So
long as there existed no direct evidence linking the candidate or his
treasurer with the "independent" committee activities, courts would not
"'Interview with Professor Daniel Pollitt, University of North Carolina School of Law, October 11, 1972.
'"See notes 12 and 235 supra for a description of a similar controversy involving an American
Civil Liberties Union advertisement in support of those congressmen who opposed President
Nixon's anti-busing legislation.
"I'S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1971).
5
'Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 4.
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be likely to pierce the committee veil in order to charge his limit for their
expenditures. 6°
The Campaign Act ignores these questions entirely, providing simply that "[a]mounts spent for the use of communications media on
behalf of any legally qualified candidate

. . .

shall . . . be deemed to

have been spent by such candidate.""' 1 The regulations promulgated by
the Comptroller General provide simply that "[a] use of communications media is deemed to be 'on behalf of the candidacy' of any such
candidate if the use (1) involves his participation by voice or image or
advocates his candidacy; or (2) identifies the candidate, directly or by
implication, or advocates his candidacy.1162 The only conclusion permitted by these provisions is that candidates will be limited in fact only to
the extent that they lend their active and open efforts to campaign
advertisement in their behalf. Short of such open involvement or rare
scrupulousness on the part of candidates, the media limitations are not
likely to limit supporters.
An equally simple evasion device is available in the anti-candidate
committee. The Comptroller General's Regulations do address this
problem directly, providing that "[a]n expenditure for the use of communications media opposing or urging the defeat of a Federal candidate, or derogating his stand on campaign issues, shall not be deemed
to be an expenditure.

. .

on behalf of any other Federal candidate and

shall not be charged against any other Federal candidate's applicable
expenditure limitation . . . unless such other Federal candidate has

directly or indirectly authorized such use or unless the circumstances of
such use taken as a whole are such that consent may be reasonably
imputed to such other candidate." 4 3 It is hard to see how any other
conclusion would be practical, but it is equally hard to escape the conclusion that, so treated, anti-candidate committees offer still another
attractive means of frustrating the media expenditure limit. The Senate
version of the Act envisioned that such expenditures would be chargea44
ble to the candidate presumably benefiting from the advertisement,
"See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 294-95 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring in part).
In addition, see Mariette v. Murray, 185 Minn. 620, 242 N.W. 331 (1932); Daniel v. Gregg, 97
N.H. 452, 91 A.2d 461 (1952) (per curiam), construing expenditure limitations to require more

than the candidate's knowledge and tacit approval. See also Note, Minnesota Corrupt Practices
Act: A Critique of the Fixed Campaign Expenditure Limitations, 40 MINN. L. REv. 155, 163

(1956).
"'Campaign Act § 104(a)(6), 86 Stat. 6, amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
11137 Fed. Reg. 6158 (1972).
46M.
" S. RaP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., IstSess. 30 (1971).
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but that version lost out in conference, and the Act does not expressly
require anti-candidate media expenditures to be so charged.465
In any event, an attempt to charge the expenditures of anticandidate committees to the limit of the candidate presumably benefiting would be just as great an infringement of the latter's free speech as
prevention of the former's expenditure would be. There are enough bona
fide opposition committees to make it unreasonable to assume that anticandidate committees are simply negative campaigns in behalf of the
favored candidate."' Even in two-way races, where the anti-candidate
committee's activities will almost certainly benefit the other candidate,
the benefiting candidate may very strongly prefer not to have a particular negative campaign or any negative campaign waged against his
opponent, but still be unable constitutionally to prevent the campaign
from occurring. 67 What then is the rationale for charging his limit for
an expenditure that he cannot prevent, even if it benefits him, and that
he would not make, even if it were within his power?
A third means of avoiding the media limit is the "issue" committee,
typically the creation of a friendly or antagonistic interest group which
has strong views on a policy stand of a particular candidate. It would
not have been possible for Senator Beall to prevent the National Rifle
Association from taking anti-Tydings advertisements in the 1970 Maryland senatorial election; for policy reasons, the NRA would have had a
special vendetta against Tydings no matter who his opponent was. Yet
its campaign obviously benefited Beall and, indeed, was the chief factor
in his election. 6 s Under the Act the NRA expenditures would not have
"IS.REP.No. 92-580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1971).
4
'The British law is different, but of course it is unconstrained by the dictates of a first
amendment. In Rex v. Hailwood, [1928] 2 K.B. 277, defendant, in a three-way race, had printed
and distributed leaflets urging the public to "[v]ote anything but Conservative." He was convicted
of violating § 34 of the Representation of the People Act which required that no one other than
the election agent of a candidate shall "incur any expenses on account of. . .issuing advertisements. . . for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of any candidate at a parliamentary election, unless he is authorized in writing to do so by such election agent." Representation
of the People Act, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64, § 34(1) (1918); cf.Rex v. Tronoh Mines, Ltd., [1952] 1 All
E.R. 697, 700 (Central Crim. Ct.), where the court held that endorsing all Conservative candidates
was not attributable to a particular Conservative candidate.
'"For example, the Justice Department has chosen to regard the Committee to Impeach
President Nixon as a political committee required to register under the Campaign Act. Presumably
its activities are thought to benefit Senator McGovern, and its advertisements would be chargeable
to his expenditure limit unless they contained the appropriate disclaimer. Yet it is questionable, at
least, whether he would prefer such advertisements to appear at all. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1972,
at 12, col. 3 (city ed.).
'"N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, at 35, col. I.
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been chargeable to BeaU. Similar issues are presented more subtly in
corporate political campaigns, such as those by Warner-Swasey' 9 and
on behalf of conservative social and economic policies, which frequently
benefit the candidate who is identified in the public mind as the defender
of those policies. Such issue campaigns are not subject to the Act's
expenditure limits. Nor, as Professor Winter points out, is it easy to
understand why, if it is thought constitutionally possible to regulate
candidate expenditures in elections, it would not logically be possible to
regulate the amount spent in issue campaigns:
If Congress can limit the television time purchased by a Senatorial

candidate, it can also limit the time purchased by groups seeking passage of particular legislation by the Senate. TV campaigns on behalf

of proposed legislation such as the McGovern-Hatfield amendment
ought surely to be as susceptible to regulation as TV campaigns to

reelect Senator McGovern or Senator Hatfield.47°
The media limits, therefore, will not and constitutionally cannot
prevent a variety of media activity that directly affects the outcomes of
elections. In exchange for the infringement of candidates' free political
speech, all we receive is a ramshackle regulatory structure which, on
balance, does not in fact limit anything of consequence and probably
leaves us worse off than before. Furthermore, the limit does not in any
way remedy whatever financial deterrence to office-seeking presently
exists because it does not provide a subsidy to non-wealthy candidates.
To the extent that undue financial advantage and undue financial influence exist, the Act does not alleviate their impact, both because it pegs
the limits substantially at current spending levels and because it leaves
more than eighty percent of campaign expenditures uncontrolled. If
spending is already so high that infringement of first amendment freedoms is justified, how can freezing spending at current levels be regarded as rationally directed at the abuse?
Finally, the enfoicement mechanism included in the Act is essentially the same for House and Senate candidates as applied under preexisting law. The failure to create a strong, neutral agency, such as an
independent federal elections commission with the power to compel
missing finance data, to punish violations of the law, and to issue final
"'See, e.g., U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 3, 1972, at 1; id., Jan. 17, 1972, at 1; id.,
Feb. 14, 1972, at 1; Id., Feb. 28, 1972, at 1.
"'Winter, supra note 377, at 60.
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election certificates 47 1 ensures that federal election laws will be as spasmodically enforced as heretofore.471 This can only serve to encourage
gradually increasing failure to conform to the requirements and a return
to the pre-Campaign Act presumption that the provisions are not law
that is to be obeyed.
Enforcement will continue to be politically selective, directed
against the party out of power in the executive branch.473 The provision
for enforcement after the election guarantees that violations of the law
will have minimum impact on the election outcome. The fact of violation becomes known too late for the people to take it into account in
voting, and the weight of victory is too heavy to be upset after the fact.
Similarly, the failure to provide a really effective system for publishing
full contributor lists and other relevant data before the election ensures
that such information cannot be taken into account by the voters, which
is the primary reason for disclosure requirements in the first place.
Finally, an enforcement mechanism without the power to certify election victors has no leverage over those whom it is supposed to police.
The power to certify the winner would give credibility to the power of
its sanctions to produce the desired information and to prevent illegal
behavior. Without such power, no threats of fines or imprisonment are
likely to have any impact at all. And the fact that the enforcers under
the Act are those whom the Act is supposed to police 474 renders the
likelihood of any coercive enforcement utterly laughable.
These are the congressional means that have been offered to
achieve the socially desirable goal of diminishing undue financial advantage, undue financial influence, and financial deterrence to candidates
in federal elections and that are supposed to justify direct regulation of
the political speech of candidates. It is difficult to imagine any means
that would have been less rationally related to those ends. If these means
are compared to non-infringing alternative means which appear to be
'This would not necessarily conflict with the final constitutional power of each House to
judge the "Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members." U.S.

CONST.

art. 1, § 5.

'Fewer than four dozen prosecutions for all kinds of corrupt practices violations have been
reported. No candidate-winner or loser-has ever been prosecuted for violation of the spending
limits. So far as can be determined, the only prosecutions of candidates have been for accepting
political money from other federal employees. There have been only eighteen corporate prosecutions since 1907, fourteen of which took place in 1969 and 1970. Less than a dozen labor unions
have been prosecuted since 1943.
3
11 A REPORT BY THE LAWYERS' REVIEW COMMITTEE TO STUDY
(1972).
'See text accompanying notes 472-73 supra.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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likely to be effective in serving the social goal involved, their unconstitutionality becomes apparent.
Less Drastic and More Effective Means of Equalizing Political

Opportunity. It was not intended that this article explore the constitutionality of alternatives to those adopted by the Campaign Act, but it
is impossible to conclude this discussion of the Act without at least
mentioning means which appear to be less drastic. They are offered here
in a tentative, exploratory and hypothetical way for purposes of comparison with the present legislation. A thorough consideration of their
constitutionality will be reserved for a subsequent analysis.
Because it does not entail restrictions on speech, a strategy of
positive public subsidization-the establishment of floors rather than
ceilings on expenditures-is infinitely preferable to a strategy of negative restraint. While there are obviously difficult equal protection problems in designing such a strategy, there are a variety of possible formulas for such support that appear feasible and constitutional and that,
most importantly, appear to have no negative first amendment consequences. 75 If the chief goal of campaign finance legislation is equality
of access to the political arena, it can be more effectively served by
establishing a floor under equal political opportunity than by imposing
a ceiling on it. Constraining those who have funds or have been able to
raise funds does not ease the plight of those without funds in the first
place. Furthermore, even if one's main concern is slowing the increase
in political costs, it may be more effective to rely on market forces to
achieve that result than on active legal intervention. As Herbert Alexander observes, "To oppose limitations is not necessarily to argue that
the sky's the limit [because in] any campaign there are saturation levels
'4 76
and a point where spending no longer pays off in votes per dollar.
The dangers of undue financial influence and undue financial advantage are much more effectively addressed by reliance on stringent
disclosure requirements for large contributions. Forty years ago, Louise
Overacker observed that large campaign expenditures may have a negative impact on the electorate,477 and, more recently, a Twentieth Century
Fund Study made the same point:
"'Professor Rosenthal explicitly suggests subsidy alternatives as a less drastic means. A.
293, at 533-42.

ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 25. See also Barrow, supra note
118H. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 234.
'"L. OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECrIONs 373 (1932).
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If there were full public disclosure and publication of all campaign
contributions and expenditures during a campaign, the voters themselves could better judge whether a candidate has spent too much. This
policy would do more to protect the political system from unbridled
spending than limits on the size of contributions and expenditures.,"
In order for public disclosure so to operate, however, it must occur
before the election. If, as suggested above," 9 a federal elections commission were established, it could be endowed with the authority to
issue-in exchange for cash paid-negotiable vouchers for all traceable
political expenditures, such as at least those covered by the 1971 Act.
The use of money to purchase political advertising could be made illegal, and the commission would have effective power to keep and publicly to issue a cumulative daily total of the amounts spent by candidates. In addition, if it were required that campaign contributions be
paid only to the commission for credit to candidates' accounts, rather
than directly to candidates or their committees, there would be a nearly
foolproof means of obtaining full disclosure of contributions before the
votes were cast. Such a voucher system would enable all political contributions and expenditures to be reported, whether authorized by a candidate or not, and whether designated for an organization opposing or
favoring a candidate. As there would be no expenditure limitations
involved, there would be a much smaller incentive to conceal the connection between candidates and "independent" committees.
The requirement that all political expenditures be paid for with
federal commission vouchers would be inconvenient and might be regarded as a prior restraint on speech, so far as newspapers and television
stations are concerned, but such prior restraint would be far less burdensome on speech than the restraint imposed by the current candidateauthorization requirement.
The existence of a strong, independent commission with such requirements would also facilitate the distribution of various forms of
public subsidy to political candidates. Vouchers for the specific purposes
recommended below could be much more easily and reliably distributed
by a commission.
First, the tax incentives enacted in 1971480 could be increased. Providing for both a deduction, which benefits higher bracket taxpayers,
11TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ELECTING CONGREss-THE FINANCIAL DILEMMA 18 (1970).

"'See text accompanying notes 472-73 supra.
4See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
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and a credit, which benefits all taxpayers, was a compromise that does
not give as much incentive as is necessary to increase small political
contributions.48 Because the credit is a much more powerful incentive
than the deduction, it should be the exclusive device, and it needs to be
made available at two or three times the present minimum of twelve and
a half dollars for individual taxpayers.
Secondly, non-frivolous 482 candidates for federal offices could be
given free mailing privileges up to the amount available to incumbents
beginning at an established date prior to primaries and general elections.
Thirdly, candidates for federal office could be given telephone,
printing, office space, and staff travel allowances equivalent to those
enjoyed by federal office incumbents.
Fourthly, the equal time provision of the Federal Communications
Act4"3 could be repealed and replaced by an explicit requirement of
access to broadcasting media for political candidates, scaled according
to established eligibility criteria. In many multi-party or multicandidate races, equal time for all means in reality no time for any.
Fifthly, a floor of publicly subsidized broadcast time could be made
available to non-frivolous candidates. The Twentieth Century Fund recommendation for the creation of "Voter's Time" on prime time television is an excellent, workable proposal for Presidential elections.484 A
similar plan for House and Senate candidates would be feasible and
constitutional. It would certainly be within Congress' power to require
stations to make a minimum amount of free prime broadcasting time
available to federal candidates as a condition of their license. There are
many other possible schemes for accomplishing the same ends, including the following: charging television stations a federal license fee, permitting the stations to deduct the fee on their tax returns, and using the
funds produced by the fee to pay for free political time; requiring the
stations to provide free time as a condition of the license, but permitting
them to deduct the value on their tax return; public purchase of the
41'N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1972, at 52, col. I
"'Serious candidates can be separated from frivolous ones by establishing subsidy qualification requirements in the nature of petition signatures of a certain percentage of eligible or registered

voters. So long as the qualification threshold is not too high, from 5%to 10% for example, there
would be no serious equal protection problem with these and following subsidies.
"1'47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1971). The Senate verison of the 1971 Act would have repealed this

provision, but it lost out in conference. Professor Barrow makes a persuasive case for modification,
rather than repeal, of section 315(a). Barrow, supra note 293, at 484.
"uTWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME 51-54 (1969).
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broadcast time at full or reduced cost; or candidate purchase of the time
at full or reduced cost, with a subsidy paid directly to the candidate. A
less attractive alternative to some preestablished eligibility criteria
might be the British practice of giving free time to candidates but requiring them to post bond for such time, which is forfeited if they fail to
get one-eighth of the votes cast in the election. Such publicly subsidized
broadcast time would enable unknown but serious candidates to prime
their candidacy and would therefore serve much more effectively than
the media expenditure limits to ease the deterrent effect of high political
advertising costs. Most important, such subsidies do not seem to infringe the first amendment.
There are undoubtedly many other possible forms of subsidy that
would directly address the goals of easing the dangers of deterrence,
undue advantage, and undue influence. The important point is that, if
properly designed, they would be both more effective and more likely
to be immune from constitutional challenge.
Conclusion. Every major scholar and study of campaign financing
has opposed contribution and expenditure limitations: Herbert Alexander,48 the President's Commission on Campaign Costs,48 the Committee for Economic Development,487 and the Twentieth Century Fund. 88
They have regarded such limitations as being difficult to administer,
incapable of dealing satisfactorily with the problems of supporters'
rights, issue committees and anti-candidate committees, and inevitably discriminatory in favor of incumbents. Between 1965 and
1970, eight states repealed their laws limiting campaign expenditures48
and even Florida repealed its limit when it adopted its much heralded
Dayton-Andrews Reporting Act of 1951.1 0 It is, therefore, difficult to
avoid a similar prediction about the efficacy of the Federal Campaign
Act. In addition, because of the serious, direct assault of media expenditure and contribution limits on first amendment freedoms, the questionable nature of the theory underlying the social interest these limits seek
"'Hearingson S. 382 Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comnn.
on Rules
and Administration, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1971).
4
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, supra note 6, at 17.
4
'"COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV., supra note 5, at 51-53.

2-21 (1969); TWENTIETH
17-19, 44-45 (1970).

"'ITWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME
ELECTING CONGRESS-THE FINANCIAL DILEMMA
411H. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 159.

CENTURY FUND,

'"Comment, Loophole Legislation-StateCampaign FinanceLaws, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 983,
998 (1967). See also Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal-Election Finance: A Case of
Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 975 (1953).
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to achieve, and the faulty means chosen by Congress for its achievement, the unconstitutionality of the limitations seems inescapable.
Most dangerous of all is the power which the existence of expenditure limitations gives to the party in control of the Department of
Justice. In a highly politicized Department such as that in the first
Nixon administration,49 ' the use of expenditure limitations to harass and
intimidate the opposition by means of investigations, prosecutions, and
press releases seems inevitable. It may very well be that such a Department would pursue such activities irrespective of the existence of the
limitations, but it can hardly be denied that their availability provides
another, and potentially most dangerous, weapon for utilization by
single-mindedly political administrators. Perhaps that fact is the most
persuasive reason of all for not permitting the government to have so
powerful a control mechanism over the process by which it itself is
selected.
POSTSCRIPT

As these words are written in the last moments of the 1972 campaign, the public outrage over campaign costs seems louder than ever.
One cannot help wondering whether the Constitution is strong enough
to protect the election process from invasion of the most fundamental
of rights. Those who care about both political freedom and equal political opportunity must hasten to formulate some viable alternatives to the
ill-advised 1971 legislation while its ineffectiveness is still uppermost in
the public mind, and before its approach hardens into accepted dogma.
Public confidence in our political institutions is at stake as never before.
Its primary choice process is far too important to the integrity of
democracy to be put at the 'mercy either of unbridled selfish interests
or of heavy-handed patchwork legislation that itself serves particular
interests to the detriment of the public interest. A token is not enough,
and an unconstitutional token is unseemly. Our democracy deserves
better; if it is to survive this era of change and crisis, it must have better.
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